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ABSTRACT 
ECONOMIC INEQUALITY IN THE NEW EUROPEAN UNION: ARE 
MONETARY POLICIES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION UNFAIR FOR 
CERTAIN COUNTRIES? 
by Gregory Eric Banach 
May 2008 
This research is focused on the affect one uniform monetary policy will have on the less 
developed countries that entered the European Union (EU) in 2004. One of the 
challenges facing the new entrants involves the required implementation of monetary 
policy goals, even though these new entrants do not have a vote on how the monetary 
policy is determined. Monetary policy in the EU is the responsibility of the European 
Central Bank (ECB) who has a stated goal price stability. It is possible to use the 
Taylor Rule to test whether the ECB focuses on price stability for both old and new 
member countries. If the Taylor rule indicates that ECB monetary policy movements 
addressed price stability for old members but not new members then this might be used 
as evidence that the ECB is not achieving its stated goals. The research seeks to answer 
the following question. During the period of March 2004 through March 2007, did the 
Taylor Rule apply to old and new member countries in the Euro-Area? If the results of 
the study point to a substantial discrepancy in applicability of the Taylor Rule for the 
old members but not the new members then there might be evidence that the ECB is not 
acting in the best interests of the Euro-area community as whole. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
On January 1, 1999, eleven countries in Europe converged to the Euro currency -
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. Greece converged shortly after on January 1, 
2001. In 2004, 10 new countries joined the European Union (EU). Seven of 
these new entrants - Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Slovakia and 
Slovenia - started taking the necessary steps to get on the Euro currency. The 
remaining 3 new entrants - Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland - are expected to 
follow eventually. Upon entry in 2004, the majority of these 7 new entrants were 
less developed than the 12 original members of the EU and faced many 
challenges as they became part of the European Monetary System. One of the 
challenges facing the new entrants involved the required implementation of 
monetary policies, even though these new entrants did not have a vote on how 
monetary policy was set. 
During the period of March of 2004 through March of 2007, monetary policy for 
these 19 European countries was the responsibility of the European Central Bank 
(ECB) who had a stated goal of maintaining price stability for Euro-area 
countries. Monetary policy goals for the EU were specifically stated in the Treaty 
Establishing the European Community, Article 105 (1) which states that monetary 
policies will be set "without prejudice to the objective of price stability." The 
treaty also stated that the ECB will "support the general economic policies in the 
Community with a view to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of 
the Community." However, with all voting power limited to the original 12 Euro-
area members, it is possible that ECB monetary policies were not addressing price 
stability for all 25 Euro-area countries. Greenberg (2005) identified the potential 
challenge for the ECB when he stated that there was a "potential conflict between 
the Executive Board, which is supposed to take a comprehensive Euro-area view 
of policy objectives, and the governors, who are typically suspected of having 
more narrow national interests in mind" (Bruess, 2005 p. 78). 
According to the official website for the ECB, the responsibility for formulating 
monetary policy for the Euro-area resides with the ECB Governing Council. This 
includes as appropriate, decisions relating to intermediate monetary objectives, 
key interest rates and the supply of reserves in the Eurosystem. The Governing 
Council is comprised of the governors of all National Central Banks for countries 
that have adopted the Euro and an Executive Board. During the period of March 
of 2004 through March of 2007 there were 12 countries who had adopted the Euro 
in addition to 6 members that made up the Executive Board, meaning a total 18 
votes were cast when deciding monetary policy movements for the entire Euro-
area. The Executive Board consisted of a President, a Vice-President and four 
other members, all chosen from among persons of recognized standing and 
professional experience in monetary or banking matters. It should be noted that 
all 6 members of the Executive Board were citizens of the 12 Euro-area countries. 
Of the 18 votes that were cast for monetary policy, France, Greece, Italy, Spain, 
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Germany, and Austria each had 2 votes; Finland, Portugal, Ireland, the 
Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Belgium each had 1 vote; and the new entrants 
had zero votes. 
As stated earlier, the makeup of the ECB decision making body leaves open the 
possibility of setting monetary policies that are not focused on price stability for 
all countries in the Euro-area community. If it is true that individuals casting 
votes "have national interests in mind" (Bruess, 2005 p. 78), then the potential 
exists for the ECB to set policies that address inflation for certain individual 
countries and not the Euro-area community as a whole. This is in direct contrast 
with the intentions of the ECB who has a stated goal of setting monetary policy 
"without prejudice to the objective of price stability" which contributes to "the 
achievement of the objectives of the Community." 
The present study will explore whether the ECB had proper focus on inflation for 
all countries in the Euro-area community. Using economic indicators for each 
country and the funds rate of the ECB, it is possible to use the Taylor Rule to test 
whether the ECB focuses on price stability for both old and new member 
countries. If the Taylor rule indicates that ECB monetary policy movements 
addressed price stability for old members but not new members then this might be 
used as evidence that the ECB is not achieving its stated goals. The research 
seeks to answer the following question. During the period of March 2004 through 
March 2007, did the Taylor Rule apply to old and new member countries in the 
4 
Euro-Area? If the results of the study point to a substantial discrepancy in 
applicability of the Taylor Rule for the old members but not the new members 
then there might be evidence that the ECB is not acting in the best interests of the 
Euro-area community as whole. 
As stated on the ECB official website, The Treaty Establishing the European 
Community, Article 105 (1), reflects the broad consensus that: 
• The benefits of price stability are substantial. Maintaining stable prices on 
a sustained basis is a crucial pre-condition for increasing economic welfare and 
the growth potential of an economy. 
• The natural role of monetary policy in the economy is to maintain price 
stability. 
As stated by the European Central Bank, price stability contributes to achieving 
high levels of economic activity and employment by: 
1. Improving the transparency of the price mechanism. Under price stability 
people can recognize changes in relative prices (i.e. prices between different 
goods), without being confused by changes in the overall price level. This allows 
them to make well-informed consumption and investment decisions and to 
allocate resources more efficiently. 
2. Reducing inflation risk premium in interest rates (i.e. compensation creditors 
ask for the risks associated with holding nominal assets). This reduces nominal 
interest rates and increases incentives to invest. 
5 
3. Avoiding unproductive activities to hedge against the negative impact of 
inflation or deflation. 
4. Reducing distortions of inflation or deflation, which can exacerbate the impact 
on economic behavior of tax and social security systems. 
5. Preventing an arbitrary redistribution of wealth and income as a result of 
unexpected inflation or deflation. 
In summary, a proper monetary system will foster financial stability for a country. 
If monetary policies are biased toward certain countries in the EU, then countries 
without proper focus on price stability could possibly experience instability. 
History of the ECB 
The foundations of the ECB can be found in the Delors report of 1989 (Abu-
Rashed et al, 1995). In June of 1988, the European Council mandated a 
committee, chaired by Jacques Delors, President of the European Commission at 
that time, to study and propose concrete stages leading to the Monetary Union. 
The committee was comprised of the governors of the national central banks in 
Europe, the general manager for the Bank for International Settlements, a member 
of the European Commission and a hand full of economic scholars. The 
European Central Bank was first conceived in the "Delors" report as part of the 
Maastricht Treaty. There were three phases to the creation and implementation of 
the ECB. The first phase began in July of 1990, and it set a 1994 deadline to 
remove capital controls within the countries of the European Union. Once the 
capital controls were removed, the second phase was established. At first, it 
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meant to create a unified monetary policy for all of the EU countries. 
Unfortunately, it was believed this quick transition would cause a great deal of 
confusion and bring about a deterioration of authority for the central banks 
currently in power. Instead, central banks within the EU attempted to coordinate 
monetary policies in Europe while they remained in full control of their respective 
national policies. At the same time, the European Monetary Institute (EMI) was 
developed in order to assist in the process of unification. The EMI would later 
become the ECB. Individual central banks gained a great deal of power at this 
point. They became politically independent institutions as the second phase 
proceeded forward. Phase three was the point at which monetary policy fell under 
full control of the ECB prior to the issue of a common currency. It was first 
hoped that a common currency could begin to be implemented by 1997, however, 
this date proved to be too aggressive and it did not allow enough time for 
monetary and fiscal convergence in all the European countries. Therefore, 
currency unification and the ECB were both officially launched in 1999 
(information obtained from the official web site of the European Central Bank, 
www.ecb.int) 
Structure and Role of the ECB 
As stated earlier, the ECB is governed by a board of directors headed by a 
Governing Council and Executive Board. The Governing Council is comprised of 
the governors of all National Central Banks for countries that have adopted the 
Euro and an Executive Board. The Executive Board includes the President, a 
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Vice-President and four other members, all chosen from among persons of 
recognized standing and professional experience in monetary or banking matters. 
The current members of the Executive Board are listed below: 
• Jean-Claude Trinchet, President - France 
• Lucas D. Papademos, Vice President - Greece 
• Lorenzo Bini Smaghi - Italy 
• Jose Manual Gonzalez-Paramo - Spain 
• Jurgen Stark - Germany 
• Gertrude Tumpel - Gugerell - Austria 
Monetary Policy Theory 
The theory of monetary policy has evolved significantly over the past 50 years. 
Monetary policy theory first became popular in literature with Milton Friedman's 
1967 Presidential address to the American Economic Association titled "The Role 
of Monetary Policy" (Friedman 1967.) Friedman is one of the first influential 
economists known as a monetarist. His research was a contrast to Keynesian 
economics from the 1960s. Keynes advocated a laissez-faire approach which 
seeks little government intervention. Keynesian economics became synonymous 
with free market economics. In contrast, Friedman and the monetarists that 
followed believed that a government sponsored central bank could implement 
tools that help guide the price stability of an economy. One of these tools 
involves the raising or lowering of overnight interest rates to member banks. By 
implementing this monetary policy tool, a central bank can be 1) accommodative 
if the interest rate set by the central bank was intended to spur economic growth 
2) neutral if it was intended to keep growth flat 3) or tight if intended to reduce 
inflation. Monetary policy theory calls for a central bank to raise rates if inflation 
is higher than desired and lower rates if inflation is lower than desired. 
The European Central Bank is the authority charged with implementing monetary 
policies for the European Union. They face many challenges as they try to 
integrate monetary policies in the European Union. The main challenge involves 
the implementation of monetary policies that meet the needs of 25 countries all 
with diverse economic conditions. Certain countries may need a tight monetary 
policy to meet their economic needs while at the same time another country may 
need an accommodative or loose monetary policy. With a single central bank 
exercising one rate movement, it becomes challenging to meet the needs of all 
European countries. 
Formulating Monetary Policy Rules 
The responsibility of formulating monetary policy for the Euro-area resides with 
the ECB Governing Council. The Governing Council meets twice a month and at 
its first meeting, as a rule, the Governing Council assesses the economic situation 
and the stance of the monetary policy. Decisions on the key interest rates are 
normally taken during this meeting. This includes as appropriate, decisions 
relating to intermediate monetary objectives, key interest rates and the supply of 
reserves in the Eurosystem. At its second meeting, the Governing Council 
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focuses mainly on issues related to other tasks and responsibilities of the ECB and 
the Eurosystem. The "Eurosystem" is the term used to refer to the ECB and the 
National Central Banks of the Member States which have adopted the Euro (also 
known as Euro-area). The Euro-area countries during the period of March of 
2004 through March of 2007 are listed below along with the countries that were 
not on the Euro currency. 
Euro-area Members 
• Austria: Osterreichische Nationalbank 
• Belgium: Nationale Bank van Belgie/Banque nationale de Belgique 
• Finland: Bank of Finland 
• France: Banque de France 
• Germany: Deutsche Bundesbank 
• Greece: Bank of Greece 
• Ireland: Banc Ceannais na hEireann / Central Bank of Ireland 
• Italy: Banca d'ltalia 
• Luexembourg: Banque Centrale du Luxembourg 
• Netherlands: De Nederlandsche Bank 
• Portugal: Banco de Portugal 
• Spain: Banco de Espana 
Non-Euro-area 
• Cyprus: Kentrike Trapeza tis Kyprou 
• Czech Republic: Ceska Narodni Banka 
• Denmark: Danmarks Nationalbank 
• Estonia: Eest Pank 
• Hungary: Magyar Nemzeti Bank 
• Latvia: Latvijas Banka 
• Lithuania: Lietuvos Bankas 
• Malta: Central Bank of Malta 
• Poland: Narodwy Bank Polski 
• Slovakia: Narodna banka Slovenska 
• Slovenia: Bank of Slovenia Banka Slovenije 
• Sweden: Sverges Riksbank 
• United Kingdom: Bank of England 
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The following map illustrates EU members and candidate countries. 
AJi.AHHC 
UCl Ah' 
Figure 1. Map of Euro-Area Countries and Candidate Countries. Map from 
online World Fact Book, US Central Intelligence Agency (https://www.cia.gov). 
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The Euro-area Members are highlighted in blue. 
^^5F 
W* ^>f 
Figure 2. Map of Countries on the Euro Currency. Taken from the official 
website of the European Central Bank (www.ecb.int). 
New Entrants and the Exchange Rate Mechanism 
Before a new country can adopt the Euro, they have to go through the Exchange 
Rate Mechanism II (ERM II) as described by the ECB. Participation in ERM II 
for at least two years is required before adopting the Euro. Participation in the 
ERM II includes shadowing monetary policy movements of the ECB. 
Participation also means meeting financial and economic convergence criteria 
which includes pegging the national currency to the Euro. As of May 1, 2004, the 
ten NCBs of the new member countries became party to the ERM II Central Bank 
Agreement. The national currencies themselves will be part of the ERM II at 
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different dates as mutually agreed. The Estonian kroon, Lithuanian litas and 
Slovenian tolar were included in the ERM II on June 28, 2004. The Cypriot 
pound, the Latvian lats and the Maltese lira were included on May 2, 2005. The 
Slovak koruna was included on November 2005. The currencies of the three 
largest countries which joined the EU in 2004 (Polish zloty, Czech koruna and 
Hungarian forint) are expected to follow eventually. As part of the ERM II, not 
only are the new entrants not allowed to conduct their respective national 
monetary policies, they also do not take part in the decision-making with regard to 
the single monetary policy for the Euro-area and the implementation of such 
decisions. 
All required financial and economic policies for the European Union are set forth 
in the Treaty on European Union which went into effect on November 1, 1993. 
This also marked the starting point of preparations for the Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU). 
Financial and economic convergence criteria are presented in Article 121(1) of 
the Treaty establishing the European Community Treaty (EC Treaty). According 
to the EC Treaty, each EU Member State is required to satisfy four convergence 
criteria in order to participate in the EMU. The four criteria are detailed below. 
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Price Stability 
The Treaty stipulates: "The achievement of a high degree of price stability... will 
be apparent from a rate of inflation which is close to that of, at most," the three 
best-performing Member States in terms of price stability." 
In practice, the inflation rate of a given Member State must not exceed by more 
than P/2 percentage points of the three best-performing Member States in terms of 
price stability during the year preceding the examination of the situation in that 
Member State. 
Government Finances 
The Treaty stipulates: "The sustainability of the government financial position... 
will be apparent from having achieved a government budgetary position without a 
deficit that is excessive." 
In practice, the Commission, when drawing up its annual recommendation to the 
Council of Finance Ministers, examines compliance with budgetary discipline on 
the basis of the following two criteria: 
• The annual government deficit: the ratio of the annual government deficit 
to gross domestic product (GDP) must not exceed 3% at the end of the preceding 
financial year. If this is not the case, the ratio must have declined substantially 
and continuously and reached a level close to 3%. This figure is interpreted in 
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trend terms according to Article 104(2) or, alternatively, must remain close to 3% 
while representing only an exceptional and temporary excess; 
• Government debt: the ratio of gross government debt to GDP must not 
exceed 60% at the end of the preceding financial year. If this is not the case, the 
ratio must have sufficiently diminished and must be approaching the reference 
value at a satisfactory pace. This figure is interpreted in trend terms according to 
Article 104(2). 
Exchange Rates 
The Treaty stipulates: "the observance of the normal fluctuation margins provided 
for by the exchange-rate mechanism of the European Monetary System, for at 
least two years, without devaluing against the currency of any other 
Member State." 
The Member State must have participated in the exchange-rate mechanism of the 
European monetary system without any break during the two years preceding the 
examination of the situation and without severe tensions. 
In addition, it must not have devalued its currency (i.e. the bilateral central rate 
for its currency against any other Member State's currency) on its own initiative 
during the same period. After transition to stage three of EMU, the European 
Monetary System was replaced by the new exchange rate mechanism (ERMII). 
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Long Term Interest Rates 
The Treaty stipulates: "the durability of convergence achieved by the 
Member State... being reflected in the long-term interest-rate levels." 
Accordingly, the nominal long-term interest rate must not exceed by more than 2 
percentage points of the three best-performing Member States in terms of price 
stability. The period taken into consideration is the year preceding the 
examination of the situation in the concerned Member State. 
Once the new entrants meet all requirements of the ERM II including the 
aforementioned financial and economic convergence criteria, they will be eligible 
to be a full active member of the ECB which includes voting rights. Until that 
time, they are subject to monetary policies set by the current decision making 
body at the ECB. Does the ECB have proper focus on price stability for all 
countries in the Euro-area community? The current study explores the answer by 
testing the applicability of the Taylor Rule. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The advent of the Euro and the ever-evolving European Central Bank has 
spawned a great deal of literature on how to evaluate and anticipate monetary 
policy movements. Monetary policy tools have evolved significantly over the 
past 50 years. Initially, monetary policy consisted of increasing the money supply 
to coincide with increases in populations and economic activity. Now, there are 
many economic factors to consider including short term interest rates, long term 
interest rates, currency valuations, international inflows and outflows and credit 
quality. Generally, all monetary governing agencies actively modify the amount 
of national currency in circulation through the sale and purchase of US Treasury 
and federal agency securities. These active market transactions conducted by the 
monetary governing agencies change the supply of national currency and this 
impacts the interest rate environment. As a result of these derivative changes, 
central banks employ different types of monetary policies in an effort to maintain 
stable economic conditions. The goals and methods of central banks vary. Here 
are some of the key monetary policies discussed in economic literature: 
• Price Level Targeting - managed by movements in the Fed Funds Rate 
with a long term goal of price stability as measured by inflation 
• Inflation Targeting - managed by movements in the Fed Funds Rate with 
a short term goal of meeting a specific, quantifiable CPI number. 
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• Monetary Aggregates - managed by the growth in money supply with a 
long term goal of price stability. 
A detailed review of these popular monetary policy tools is shown below. 
Price Level Targeting 
While no Central Bank claims to use price level targeting (Haldane 1995, and 
Leiderman and Svensson 1995), many of the top central banks claim that their 
goal is price stability. According to Svensson (1999), stability means that 
inflation is kept at low levels without rapid swings, in an effort to maintain this 
price stability, central banks will evaluate certain key economic variables and try 
to decipher how these variables contribute to the swing in price movements. 
Estimating the economic variables and respective price movements becomes an 
important element when implementing price level targeting. In order to estimate 
movements in key economic indicators that affect price levels, certain instrument 
rules are often used by economic scholars. There are several "instrument rules" 
discussed in current literature. One of the most prevalent instrument rules in 
economic literature is known as the Taylor rule. 
The Taylor Rule 
The Taylor Rule is an algebraic equation created by John Taylor, an economic 
scholar from Stanford University. Taylor developed the rule to provide guidance 
on how a central bank should set short-term interest rates when the economic 
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conditions change. Specifically, the rule gives guidance on how to keep the 
economy stable in the short term and keep inflation at acceptable levels for the 
long term (Taylor, 1993). The rule sets parameters for interest rates (adjusted for 
real inflation) based on three factors: (1) the variance between the actual inflation 
rate and the target rate of the Fed (2) the variance between current employment 
and full employment, and (3) the level at which short term interest rates are 
consistent with full employment. The rule indicates a tighter monetary policy 
(raising rates) when inflation is higher that it's optimal rate or when the economy 
is above its full employment level; and an easing policy (lowering rates) when 
inflation is lower than the optimal rate or the economy is below the full 
employment level. 
Although the United States Federal Reserve does not claim to use the Taylor rule, 
research shows that the rule does an accurate job of describing how monetary 
policy actually has been conducted by the United States Federal Reserve. This 
fact has been cited by many economic scholars and central bank practitioners 
(Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 1997; Judd and Rudebusch, 1998). Gerlach and 
Schnabel demonstrate that average interest rates in the European Monetary Union 
moved very closely with average output gaps and inflation as suggested by the 
Taylor Rule during the period of 1990-1998 (Gerlach and Schnabel 1999). 
Taylor's original rule is an equation defined as follows (Taylor, 1993, P 202): 
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r = p+.5 y+.5 (p-2) + 2 (1) 
Where 
r is the federal funds rate 
p is the rate of inflation over the previous four quarters 
y is the percent deviation of real GDP from a target 
The Taylor rule also has taken the following form in literature: 
it = nt + rt+.5(nt-nt*) + .5(yt) (2) 
Where it is the targeted policy interest rate, nt is the rate of inflation, rt is the real 
rate of interest, nt* is the desired rate of inflation, and^ is the output gap. 
Since the initial presentation of the Taylor Rule in 1993, a number of modified 
versions have been presented in economic literature. Taylor's original rule is 
considered backward looking meaning that it calls for monetary policy 
movements to be based on past changes in inflation and output gap. In contrast, 
many studies show that central banks also respond to expected inflation and 
output. This has spawned forward looking versions of the Taylor rule. 
In addition to being a backward looking model, the original Taylor rule also 
suggests that central banks make immediate adjustments to targeted interest rate 
levels. Several studies have shown that central banks actually take a more gradual 
approach to raising interest rates by making a series of interest rate adjustments in 
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small increments. To account for discrepancies in the original Taylor rule, several 
studies make minor variations to the original rule. These variations to Taylor's 
original rule have become known as Taylor type rules. A Taylor type rules often 
keeps the basic framework of Taylor's original work however, they display an 
alternative assumption. Kozicki (1999) categorized some of these alternative 
assumptions as follows: 
• Interest rate smoothing 
• Timing 
• Measurement 
Interest Rate Smoothing 
Several Taylor type rules have been presented in literature that allow for interest 
rate smoothing. Interest rate smoothing refers to the central bank's common 
practice of setting a smooth path of interest rates over time, changing gradually 
and not reversing the trend in a quick fashion. Many economists suggest that the 
United States Federal Reserve uses smoothing when conducting interest rate 
adjustments (Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 1997; Mehra, 2001; and Woodford, 2001). 
In order to account for interest rate smoothing, versions of the Taylor rule have 
been presented in literature. For example, Kozicki (1999) discussed the following 
Taylor type rule estimation without smoothing: 
funds rate (t) = p x {funds rate (t-1) ) + (1 -p) x (unsmoothed target (t)) 
unsmoothed target (t=) constant + (1+a) x inflation (t-1) + P x 
(output gap (t-1)) (3) 
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Where p represents the degree of smoothness in monetary policy, a represents the 
weight in the output gap adjustment factor, and P is the weight given to the output 
gap adjustment factor. The inflation target and equilibrium real interest rate are 
incorporated in constant. 
With this equation, as the smoothness factors increase from 1 to 0, a more gradual 
series of Fed fund movements is recommended (Kozicki, 1999). 
Timing 
Taylor's original rule called for current levels of inflation and output gap, 
however, real time data for inflation and the output gap are not readily available. 
These statistics are often reported with a monthly or quarterly lag. To account for 
this lag, Stuart (1996) presented a Taylor type rule where quarterly inflation and 
output gap data are included with a quarterly lag. Stuart's specification is shown 
below: 
I = pt-\ + w\ ((Y_Y*)/Y*)t-\ + w2(p-p*)t-i +r* (4) 
Were/? is the annual rate of inflation as reported by the RPIX index instead of the 
GDP deflator (RPIX mirrors the Retail Price Index excluding mortgage interest 
payments), p* is targeted inflation, r* is the equilibrium real rate of interest and 
(Y_Y*)IY* is the output gap, w\ represents the weight given to the deviation of 
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output from its trend, w2 represents the weight given to the deviation of output 
from its target. 
With this specification, inflation and the output gap are accounted for with a 
quarterly lag. Adding a lag term to account for delayed data reporting has 
become common practice when using the Taylor rule. 
Measurements 
One of the hotly debated issues in literature regarding the Taylor rule is the proper 
measurement of inflation and the real interest rate. Judd and Rudebusch state that 
"there is much uncertainty in choosing values for r* and 7t,*" (Judd and 
Rudebusch, 1998, p.8). 
The measurement of inflation varies between central banking systems. The 
original Taylor rule used the percent change in the GDP price deflator. The GDP 
price deflator is an economic metric that accounts for inflation by converting 
output measured at the current price level into a constant GDP dollar level. The 
GDP deflator shows how much of the change in the base year's GDP is attributed 
to changes in the price level. It is still common practice in economic literature to 
use the GDP deflator when analyzing the United States Federal Reserve monetary 
policy movements. In contrast, when analyzing monetary policy conducted by 
the ECB, many economic scholars use the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices 
(Sauer and Sturm 2003, Ullrich 2003). The Harmonized Index of Consumer 
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Prices, or HICPs, is a set of EU Consumer Price Indices calculated with a single 
set of definitions. The Harmonized methodology is coordinated and led by 
Eurostat and reported on a monthly basis. The current study will be focused on 
monetary policy in the EU and will use the HICP as the measure of inflation. 
Not only are there variations in economic literature when measuring inflation, 
there are also variations in measuring the real rate of interest. The real interest 
rate is the effective interest rate minus the rate of inflation. In general terms, the 
real interest rate is often the rate of return on a risk free investment minus an 
index for inflation such as the CPI, GDP deflator or HICP. In the Euro-area, the 
long term average for German short term real rates is often used for the Taylor 
formula since the ECB has been constructed after the model of the Bundesbank 
(Bofinger, 2002). The 40 year average as reported by the Bundesbank is 2.8% 
(Bofinger, 2002). However, the near term average since 1999 is closer to 1.6%. 
Taylor's original rule used a 2% rate (Taylor, 1993) and Sauer and Sturm (2003) 
argue that the original 2% rate as used by Taylor should do reasonably well for 
the Euro-area. In contrast to Sauer and Sturm, this study will be doing a 
comparative analysis for several different countries in the EU. As a result, a short 
term interest rate as suggested by Bofinger will be most appropriate. Specifically, 
this study will use the short term overnight rate specific to each country as report 
by each country's national bank. 
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Arguments Against the Taylor Rule 
The Taylor rule is often referred to as an "instrument rule" (Svennson, 2002) 
where numbers are simply plugged into a formula. Svennson (2002) argues that 
using an instrument rule leaves a void for judgment when trying to define optimal 
target interest rate. If an instrument like the Taylor Rule is used to solve for an 
optimal interest rate, then there is no ability to make necessary judgmental 
adjustments for the extra-model information. Svennson (2002) gave possible 
examples of "extra-model" information, which include stock market crashes, an 
"Asian Crisis" or the floating of the Brazilian Real. McCallum (2000) made a 
similar argument when he stated that no actual central bank would ever be 
literally bound by any simple formula. If this were true McCallum (2000) stated 
that policy decision could be turned over to clerk with a calculator. 
Svennson successfully argued that a simple instrument rule provides method 
challenges especially due to extra model information. As a result, the current 
study will take into account any "extra model" events that may have occurred in 
the host economies. If an isolated event occurred in an economy, then an 
adjustment will be made to offset the affect the event had on the results of the 
current study. 
Inflation Targeting 
During the 1990s, monetary authorities in many countries placed increasing 
importance on price stability. However, some central banks found that traditional 
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monetary policies were not very successful. To address this problem, several 
industrialized countries adopted monetary policies that targeted inflation directly. 
Inflation targeting was first introduced in New Zealand in 1990. It spread to 
Canada in 1991, the United Kingdom in 1992 and Sweden, Finland and Australia 
in 1993. Brazil was the first developing country to use inflation targeting and the 
Czech Republic was the first transitional economy to incorporate it. Recent 
additions include Iceland, Switzerland and Norway (Svennson, 2002). 
These central bank regimes are said to be more credible because they publicly 
state a specific interest rate (target rate) for a specific time period (Croce and 
Kahn, 2000). Implementation of inflation targeting begins with setting a specific 
price inflation goal. The consumer price index (CPI) is one of the most common 
measures for inflation targeting. However, sometimes the central bank excludes 
certain components of the CPI index that may skew the numbers. A popular 
example is housing costs. While the CPI index should go down when the central 
bank executes a tightening policy, the housing numbers actually go up due to a 
rise in mortgage interest rates. As a result, many of the countries engaged in 
targeting inflation use the CPI minus mortgage payments or a cost of housing 
component. Similarly, other countries like Canada and New Zealand disregard 
commodity prices when calculating the targeted price index on the grounds that 
increases or decreases in the price of commodities (like oil) cannot be controlled 
by monetary policies of the central bank. 
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Once a price index is chosen, a target rate is set to fluctuate in a range and a 
timetable for achieving the goal is announced. The specified target rate provides 
a center point for central banks, and it also sets expectations for the private 
market. Whether or not they hit the target is the measure of central bank 
effectiveness (Huh, 1997). 
Mishkin (2004) makes the argument that inflation targeting decreases uncertainty 
about future monetary policies, which ultimately decreases market volatility. He 
also claims that the transparent nature of inflation targeting (through pre-
announced, well defined inflation targets) is more consistent with democratic 
principles and he argues that the United States Federal Reserve should adopt this 
policy. 
Croce and Kahn (2000) argue that the inflation performance of countries using 
inflation targeting has shown success. They state that the focus on price stability 
has resulted in a large convergence of inflation rates among countries that have 
implemented interest rate targeting rules. However, they do point out that it is 
unclear whether inflation targeting will continue to ensure a low inflation trend, as 
inflation targeting needs to show its relevance in a full business cycle. 
Inflation targeting has gained recent praise in literature as an effective way of 
measuring central bank efficiency. It is very simple - if the central bank met the 
target then their policies were efficient; if they did not meet the target then the 
policies were not efficient. The downside for this method is that it can only be 
tested by countries that have officially engaged in inflation targeting. The only 
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European countries using inflation targeting are the UK, Sweden and the Czech 
Republic (Svensson, 2002). Since very few EU countries are using inflation 
targeting it is not possible for me to use this method to test central bank 
efficiency. 
Monetary Aggregates 
Monetary aggregates, also known as the money supply, represent the quantity of 
currency in consumer bank accounts available to purchase goods, services and 
securities. Central banks are able to control this by buying or selling government 
obligations. The ECB and United States Federal Reserve both have a primary 
goal of price stability. Galina and Jorda (2007) state that the ECB and the Fed 
agree on most monetary policy tools to achieve price stability with the exception 
of one notable difference. The ECB put some emphasis on money supply as a 
means to achieve price stability. In contrast, the United States Federal Reserve 
does not put an emphasis on monetary aggregates. 
To take a closer look at this difference, the ECB held a conference in 2006 
entitled "The Role of Money: Money and Monetary Policy in the Twenty First 
Century." At this conference Fischer, Lenza, Pill, and Reichlin, (2006) claimed 
that inflation forecasts can be improved if the forecasts included analysis of the 
money supply. Gali (2006) argued the paper submitted by Fischer, Lenza, Pill 
and Reichlin (2006), claiming that their results were not consistent with recent 
research in the United States on the same subject matter. Woodford (2006) also 
argued the findings of Fishcer, Lenza, Pill and Reichlin (2006) by claiming that 
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the goals of monetary policy could be reached without focusing on monetary 
aggregates. Further validation for the argument against monetary aggregates 
came when the OECD issued their 2007 Economic Survey of the Euro Area. As 
pointed out by Galina and Jorda (2007), the OECD report stated that the 
predictive power of monetary aggregates diminished significantly since the year 
2000. 
In addition to monetary policies, current literature also discusses ways to test 
whether a central bank displays biased tendencies (Havrilesky 1993) or whether 
they are efficient (McKinley and Banaian, 2003). 
The Havrilesky Approach - Testing Biased Pressure in Monetary Policy 
According to Maier, Sturm and Haan (2002), testing biased pressure in monetary 
policy "encounters a number of methodological problems." They argue that 
biased pressure on a central bank may arise from politicians and special interest 
groups. To test the possible biased nature of a central bank, they adopted the 
approach developed by Havrilesky (1993). 
Havrilesky assumes that conflicts between the government and central banks get 
reported in the newspaper. Therefore, Havrilesky counted the number of articles 
in the Wall Street Journal where government officials called for changes in 
monetary policy. Specifically, Havrilesky developed the SAFER index, which is 
an indicator for political pressure on the Federal Reserve based on the number of 
newspaper articles reporting a politician's preference of either a "tight" monetary 
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policy or an "easing" monetary policy. The articles in the Wall Street Journal that 
called for a tighter policy received a +1, and the articles that demanded an easing 
policy received a -1. The sum of the plusses and minuses created the SAFER 
index. Havrilesky (1993) argued that regression analysis on Federal Funds rates 
shows that the SAFER index is highly relative. Froyen, Havrilesky and Waud 
(1997) additionally argue that if economic control variables are included in the 
model for the interest rate, the SAFER index remains significant. Maier, Sturm 
and Haan (2002) applied this method to the central bank in Germany, however 
they expanded the extent of the press coverage. They chose three newspapers in 
Germany to conduct their study and they also took into account reports from 
different special interest groups. 
Maier, Sturm and Haan (2002) point out some potential problems with the 
Havrilesky approach. First, a central bank conflict will potentially get more 
newspaper coverage during times of slow news than during a time when there is a 
large amount of alternative news to report. Secondly, the safer index makes the 
assumption that two articles correspond to double the amount of central bank 
pressure than one article which may not be correct. 
One final problem for using the Havrilesky approach in the current study involves 
the lack of a national newspaper for the European Union. There is no comparable 
newspaper like the Wall Street Journal used in Havilesky's research or the 3 
German newspapers used by Maier, Sturm and Haan. As a result of the 
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aforementioned challenges with this research, and most importantly, the lack of a 
reliable and respected European Union regional newspaper, it will not be feasible 
to use the Havrilesky approach in the current research. 
McKinley and Banaian's Measurement of Central Bank Efficiency 
McKinley and Banaian's method for evaluating a central bank involved "central 
bank efficiency" (McKinley and Banaian, 2003). They state that an activity 
generating a given output is "efficient" if there is no alternative method of 
generating the optimal output with less input. However, there is a challenge in 
developing a definition of central bank operating efficiency and therefore some 
general conclusions regarding inputs and outputs were defined. McKinely and 
Banaian generally conclude that the required outputs for a central bank are 
monetary policy, foreign exchange management and bank supervision. A central 
bank's inputs are labor and capital used to obtain the objective. Applying these 
conclusions, Mckinley and Banaian's (2003) definition of central bank 
operational efficiency is as follows: 
"The measure of how central banks use resources or inputs (labor and capital) to 
implement their various granted functions in pursuit of their objective or output, 
as compared to peer central banks" (McKinley and Banaian 2003, p 48.) Based 
on this definition, there is a large amount of internal documentation on labor and 
capital that must be gathered in order to measure central bank operating 
efficiency. This information is available for a central bank to conduct an internal 
analysis of their own operating efficiency. However, until all this information is 
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made public for every subject country in the EU, the current study will not be able 
to employ this method. 
While several methods have been mentioned as part of this literature review, the 
Taylor rule dominates the literature. It is often cited by many of the top scholars 
and economists around the world. As a result of rule's general academic 
acceptance, the current study's methodology will rely heavily on the Taylor rule. 
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CHAPTER III 
THEORY AND METHODS 
The chosen method for this research involves a comparison of interest rate 
movements using the Taylor Rule. Taylor's theoretical rule was originally 
presented at the 1993 Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy. 
This Conference on public policy, dating back to the early 1970's, was organized 
to stimulate policy relevance and empirical research in economics. At the 1993 
conference, John Taylor suggested that good policy rules typically call for 
changes in the federal funds rate in response to changes in the level of prices or 
changes in real income. Specifically, the rule presented by Taylor calls for the 
Federal Reserve to raise the federal funds rate if inflation increases above a target 
of 2% or if real GDP rises above the GDP trend. Despite presenting an algebraic 
equation, Taylor points out that a policy rule does not need to be a mechanical 
formula. As he states, a policy rule can be implemented and operated more 
informally by policy makers who recognize the general instrument reactions that 
underlie the policy rule and also recognize that using such a rule requires 
judgment. In Taylor's multi-country model, he simulated economic performance 
under several different monetary policy rules for Canada, France, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Every country's economic 
performance was examined under different policy rules. The policy rules were 
then ranked according to how successful they were in achieving price stability and 
output stability. After conducting all the tests for the different policy rules for 
each country, Taylor drew the general conclusion that placing some weight on 
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real output works better than a simple price rule. One policy rule that carried the 
spirit of the research was an equation which later became known as the Taylor 
Rule. As shown earlier, here the original rule as presented by Taylor (Taylor, 
1993, P 202). 
r - p+.5 y+.5 (p-2) + 2 (1) 
Where 
r is the federal funds rate 
p is the rate of inflation over the previous four quarters 
y is the percent deviation of real GDP from a target 
Once again, the Taylor rule often takes the following form in literature: 
it = nt + rt+.5(nt-Kt*) + .5(yt) (2) 
Where it is the targeted policy interest rate, itt is the rate of inflation, rt is the 
assumed real rate of interest, iit* is the desired rate of inflation, and yt is the output 
gap-
Taylor assumed that the weights the Fed gave to inflation and output had an equal 
50% weighting. Therefore, if either inflation or the output gap were above their 
target, a proportionate adjustment would be made to the federal funds rate. 
In order to show the relationship between the actual Federal Reserve policy 
movements and rates suggested by the rule, Taylor created a plotted graph. The 
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graph shown below displays time on the x-axis and interest rates on the y-axis. 
Taylor plotted both the fed funds rates and the rates suggested by Taylor. This 
graph shows a noticeable resemblance between the Taylor Rule and actual fed 
fund movements. 
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Figure l. Federal funds rate and example policy rule. 
Figure 3. Taylor's Original Policy Rule versus the Fed Funds Rate from John 
Taylor. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Taylor, 1993 p 
204. 
Taylor's theoretical rule has been tested by many academic scholars and 
economic practitioners. Yellen (1995) validated the Taylor rule by stating "a 
reaction function in which the real funds rate changes by roughly equal amounts 
in response to deviations of inflation from a target of 2 percent and to deviations 
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of actual from potential output describes reasonably well what this committee has 
done since 1986... If we wanted a rule I think the Fed (Greenspan) has done very 
well following such a rule, and I think that is what sensible central banks do." 
Additional validation came from research conducted by Judd and Rudebusch 
(1998) when they estimated a model of the United States Federal Reserve's 
"reaction function" defined as the relationship between economic activity and the 
US Federal Reserve's response to them. Judd and Rudebusch (1998) focused on 
how the reaction function estimate changed from period to period, however, their 
results also show similarities between the Taylor Rule and actual Fed fund 
movements. In their study, they considered three sub samples categorized by the 
terms of the residing Fed Chairmen. Specifically they considered the terms of 
Arthur Burns from 1970-1978, Paul Volcker from 1979-1987 and Alan 
Greenspan from 1987-1998. The graph from their study is displayed below. 
Figure 4. Judd and Rudebush Comparing Taylor Rule to Different Fed Chairs 
from Judd and Rudebush. Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic 
Review, 1998, p 5. 
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Once again, the Taylor Rule shows a strong resemblance to actual Federal 
Reserve movements especially during the Greenspan and Volcker periods. The 
underlying principle for Judd and Rudebusch (1998) research was to determine if 
the Taylor rule can be used as a quality measure of the general weight differences 
given to policy tool variables. They claim that it is fairly straight forward to 
estimate a Taylor Rule by inputting the historical rates, adding a residual error 
term and estimating the rates as coefficients. However, the central banks often 
adjust interest rates gradually toward a desired setting. To account for this 
gradual change, Judd and Rudebusch (1998) use a modified version of the Taylor 
Rule. 
Their version is shown below: 
it* =itt + r* + Bi( %, - nt*) +-B2yt + Biyri (5) 
In contrast to equation 1, this equation contains an extra lagged gap term in 
addition to the contemporaneous gap. According to Judd and Rudebush, this 
allows for the possibility of gradual movements in proposed monetary policy 
rates. 
As a summary, Judd and Rudebusch (1998) stated that "overall, the estimated 
dynamic Taylor-type reaction functions do provide a way to capture important 
elements of policy regimes in place during these periods" (p. 4). Their results 
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show that Taylor's theoretical context is a valuable way to summarize important 
elements of monetary policy. 
Results of research by Seyfried and Bremmer (2001) gave further validation when 
they also used the Taylor Rule in order to analyze the behavior of the United 
States Federal Reserve under the leadership of three Federal Reserve chairs: 
Arthur Burns, Paul Volcker and Alan Greenspan. The results of the study showed 
that Burns paid little attention to inflation and inflationary pressures. Volcker 
focused on reducing actual inflation during his first term while turning his 
attention to the GDP gap and inflationary pressures in his second term. 
Greenspan emphasized preemptive strikes against inflation as indicated by high 
weights attributed to the GDP gap and expected inflation. 
The research by Seyfried and Bremmer (2001) extended the research of Judd and 
Rudebusch (1998). The research by Seyfried and Bremmer began by pointing out 
common concerns to consider when using the Taylor rule. One concern is the 
actual measure of inflation to use in the equation. Should the GDP deflator be 
used as originally suggested by Taylor or should the consumption deflator, made 
popular by Greenspan, be used? Should the consumer price index be used since it 
is more readily available and able to reduce the lag in policy? Should ex post 
inflation rate data be used instead of survey data about future expected inflation? 
These questions were addressed in the Seyfried and Bremmer (2001) study and it 
is concluded that Taylor type rules as originally presented with the GDP deflator, 
CPI and inflation "perform well in explaining the various Fed regimes" (Seyfried 
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and Bremmer, 2001, p. 24). However, Seyfried and Bremmer also proposed a 
change to the original Taylor rule to account for possible changes that the Fed 
may make to the federal funds rate as an immediate response to changes in the 
right hand side of the Taylor rule equation. They argue that there is anecdotal 
evidence suggesting that the Fed may attempt to smooth changes in the federal 
funds rate to compensate for disturbances in financial markets and uncertainty as 
to how quickly the economy will respond to policy changes. The equation they 
used (shown below) is the same modified version as Judd and Rudebusch (1998). 
it* =%t + r* + Bi( 7i, - Ti,*) + Bzv/ + B3yri (5) 
These variables were defined earlier. Congruent with Seyfried and Bremmer 
(2001), this model suggests that rate movements by United States Federal Reserve 
have a certain lag period. Both Judd and Rudebusch (1998) and Seyfried and 
Bremmer (2001) decided to account for possible lags with the following equation: 
A ft = y (i*t- it-\) + p A it\ (6) 
Where ft is the federal funds rate from (3), y represents the speed of adjustment 
and p measures the persistence of monetary policy. 
By substituting equation 3 into 4, they displayed the equation to be estimated: 
A ft = y & - y if\ + y(l + A, I) %t+yXiyt + y Xiyt\ + p A it-\ (7) 
where & = r* - X i7t* 
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This equation, presented in studies by Judd and Rudebusch (1998) and Seyfried 
and Bremmer (2001), uses the same dynamics of the Taylor rule however, it 
accounts for different speeds in fed adjustments. 
The Taylor Rule and the European Union 
The research by Seyfried and Bremmer (2001) and Judd and Rudebusch (1998) 
show that the Taylor Rule can be an effective way of determining how monetary 
policy should have been set by the United States Federal Reserve Bank. 
However, does the rule apply to monetary policies set by the ECB? To address 
this question, this study refers to research from Gerlach and Schnabel (1999) who 
did a study of the Taylor rule and monetary policy tools in the European 
Monetary Union (EMU). Their research analyzed monetary policy in the 
European Monetary Union during a sample period from 1990 to 1997. Prior to 
the existence of the European Central Bank, the European Monetary Union was 
created to assist conversion of national currencies to the Euro. The EMU 
included all National Central Banks in Europe which shared policy framework as 
they led up to the creation of the European Central Bank (ECB). Countries 
involved in this research included Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United 
Kingdom (Luxembourg, Finland and Portugal were excluded due to unreliable 
data). Gerlach and Schnabel (1999) claim in their report that a "Taylor Rule 
captures the behavior of average interest rates in the EMU area in the 1990-1997 
period, with the exception of the period of exchange market turbulence in 1992-
1993, extremely well" (p. 1). In their report, Gerlach and Schnabel showed data 
on a quarterly basis for output gaps in the EMU. They developed this data by 
interpolating both annual and semi-annual data on output gaps as reported by 
OECD. The inflation variable used in the Taylor Rule was defined by Gerlach 
and Schnabel (1999) as the annual change in quarterly averages from national 
consumer price indices. Like Taylor (1993), they assumed the inflation objective 
in the EMU area was 2%. Gerlach and Schnabel (1999) admitted that estimating 
the real rate of interest was more difficult. One option, as stated by Gerlach and 
Schnabel (1999), was to use a weighted average of ex post real interest rates over 
that period in discussion. However, Gerlach and Schnabel (1999) claimed that 
countries with low monetary policy credibility (developing countries of Europe) 
have had relatively high ex post real interest rates and they felt that this could 
result in an overestimation of the equilibrium real rate of interest for the EMU. 
As a result, they extracted the ex post real interest rates that may have been due to 
low credibility and then computed the average realized real interest rate over the 
period 1982-1997. Finally, they did a regression analysis for the actual interest 
rate, output gap and inflation rate. The results of the study show that the 
monetary policies set by the ECB were in line with the Taylor Rule. Specifically, 
Gerlach and Schnabel (1999) state that the interest rate movements "would in fact 
not deviate much from past (weighted) interest rate setting behavior in the 
countries forming the EMU area" (p 4). 
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Sauer and Sturm (2003) also applied the Taylor rule to European countries when 
they estimated several instrument policy reaction functions for the ECB. They 
analyzed monetary policy for the tenure of the first president of the ECB, Mr. 
Duisenberg. Sauer and Sturm (2003) compare the official monetary policy during 
Duisenberg's tenure with actual policy as measured by the Taylor rule. They 
overlaid the suggested Taylor rule, the suggested interest rate and actual ECB 
interest rate. The graph shows a strong relationship between the actual central 
bank policy rate and the expected interest rate as determined by the Taylor rule. 
When describing the graph, Sauer and Sturm state that "the coincidence of the 
actual nominal interest rate and the Taylor Rule is quite striking" (p. 7). 
Gerlach and Schnabel (1999), and Sauer and Sturm (2003) make the argument 
that Taylor rule is effectively transferable to monetary policy in the European 
Union, however their research was conducted on the more developed, long 
standing members of the European Union. Will the rule be effective for the new 
entrants, many of which operate in a small developing economy? Laxton and 
Pesenti (2003) use a stochastic general equilibrium model to give an explanation 
of trade and macroeconomic reliance between large industrialized countries and 
smaller open economies. The model was then calibrated with special detail 
placed on the model's ability to create relevant responses of measurable economic 
variables to a wide range of shocks in the economy. Specifically, they suggest 
that the stochastic dynamic general equilibrium model is capable of replicating 
the important aspects of the monetary policy tools as estimated by monetary 
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authorities. Finally, they compare the performance of the monetary policy tools 
in two specific categories - general Taylor Rules and inflation forecasting models. 
The focus of their research is to compare and to contrast the effect of different 
policy tools in emerging countries that are very different in size and economic 
scope. With this in mind, their research can be generally applied to smaller, 
emerging economies no matter what stage of development they are currently in. 
To provide a specific example, Laxton and Pesenti identify Czech Republic as a 
representative in the Euro-area with a small yet emerging economy. The study 
findings are meant to provide a benchmark in analyzing monetary policy rules in 
heterogeneous economies. Although the research in this area is limited and new, 
Laxton and Pesenti claim that it is "expected to take off." 
This identifies one of the challenges for present research on monetary policies for 
the developing countries that recently joined the EU. Research in this area is 
limited, new and fragmented. The Taylor rule has been proven to be an effective 
measure of how monetary policy should be conducted in the United States and the 
established countries in the EU however, there is limited research on the Taylor 
rule in the smaller emerging economies like the new entrants to the EU. The 
results of the study by Laxton and Pesenti address this issue. Their study findings 
show that "rules that perform well in models for the US economy also perform 
well in our simulation model of a relatively closed economy" (p 41). 
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After reviewing the methods used in current literature, it can be successfully 
argued that the Taylor rule is an effective way of determining how monetary 
policy should have been conducted. The weakness in the rule is the estimation of 
inflation in order to predict future interest rate movements with gradual Fed 
movements. However, to account for gradual rate increases by the Fed, a lag 
adjustment factor can be added as suggested by Judd and Rudebusch (1998) and 
Seyfried and Bremmer (2001). Carlstrom and Fuerst (2003) summed this up well 
when they said that "the rule can be easily adjusted to accommodate inflation 
targets other than the 2 percent level suggested by Taylor or structural changes in 
the economy that affect the natural real federal funds rate" (p. 3). Carlstrom and 
Fuerst add that the exact form of the Taylor rule is probably not that important. 
What is important, however, is that potential guideposts satisfy the Taylor 
principle. One of the important guideposts on the right side of the equation is the 
output gap. Unlike the other parts of the equation, the output gap is an estimate. 
Both Judd and Rudebusch (1998) and Seyfried and Bremmer (2001) use the 
method for estimating output gap as suggested by the Congressional Budget 
Office (CBO). The CBO method is also often used by policy makers and the 
Federal Reserve (Judd and Rudebusch, 1998). As a result, the present study will 
calculate the output gap using the Hodrick Prescott method according to CBO 
standards. 
Inflation versus Output Gap 
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The original Taylor rule has a 50% weighting for inflation and a 50% weighting 
for the output gap. Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1997) used a modified version of 
the Taylor rule to test whether central banks actually have a proper emphasis on 
each variable. The study by Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1997) specifically looks at 
two groups of countries. They study examines G3 - United States, Germany and 
Japan - and E3 - France, Italy and the United Kingdom. Central banks for these 
countries have great autonomy over monetary policy decisions and all have 
claimed price stability to be a top monetary policy priority. Their study explored 
whether monetary policy movements were aimed at keeping an equal weighting 
for output and inflation or whether other factors were given greater weight. Their 
study assumes that during each specified period, a central bank has a short term 
interest rate target that is based on the state of the economy. Their study 
estimated coefficients ((3) on inflation and the output gap. In their study, if the 
coefficient was > 1 then they assumed the target real rate adjusts to stabilize both 
inflation and output. If the coefficient is < 1 then they assumed monetary policy 
was primarily focused on changes in inflation. In their study, they find that even 
though the central bank may increase the fed funds rate in response to an expected 
increase in inflation, it may not increase it sufficiently to keep the real rate from 
declining. This explains why rapid increases in inflation and output may be 
possible. Therefore, they claim that the "estimated magnitude of the parameter p 
provides an important yardstick for evaluating a central bank's policy rule" 
Clarida, Gali and Gertler 1997, p 5). 
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The current study will use a similar model to the one introduced by Clarida, Gali 
and Gertler (1997). In order to estimate coefficients on inflation and the output 
gap, the current study will use a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). The 
Method of Moments is an estimation technique which equates sample moments 
with unobservable population moments and then solves those equations for the 
quantities to be estimated. In other words, the Method of Moments suggests that 
the unknown parameters should be estimated by matching population moments 
with the appropriate sample moments. The Generalized Method of Moments over 
identifies the moment conditions. GMM estimation was formalized by Hansen 
(1982) and has become one of the most widely accepted methods of estimation 
for models in economics. 
The currents study will use GMM to estimate the coefficient on both inflation and 
the output gap. A p-value will also be calculated for each. The p-value is the 
probability of obtaining a result at least as extreme as a given data point under the 
null hypothesis. Under the null for the current study, the ECB will be consistent 
with its focus on "price stability" where inflation is targeted. If the p-value is 
less than .1 then we will assume that inflation is targeted. If the p-value is greater 
than . 1 then we will assume inflation was not targeted. 
Data for each variable will be collected from recognized authorities such as the 
ECB, Eurostat, The European Commission and National Central Banks. Below is 
a summary of the sources to be used in gathering the data: 
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Real rate of interest (rt) - In the Euro-area, the long term average for German 
short term real rates is often used for the Taylor formula since the ECB has been 
constructed after the model of the Bundesbank (Bofinger, 2002). However, the 
near term average since 1999 is closer to 1.6%. Taylor's original rule used a 2% 
rate (Taylor, 1993) and Sauer and Sturm (2003) argue that the original 2% rate as 
used by Taylor should do reasonably well for the Euro-area. However, in contrast 
to Sauer and Sturm, this study will be doing a comparative analysis for 15 
different countries in the EU. As a result, a short term interest rate as suggested 
by Bofinger will be most appropriate. Specifically, this study will use the short 
term overnight rate specific to each country as report by each country's national 
bank. 
Desired Rate of Inflation (71**) - The ECB's Governing Council has stated the 
following definition for price stability: "Price stability is defined as a year-on-year 
increase in the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) for the Euro area of 
below 2%" (taken from the official website of the ECB www.ecb.int). The HICPs 
are a set of EU Consumer Price Indices calculated with a single set of definitions. 
The Harmonized methodology is coordinated and led by Eurostat. According to 
Eurostat, the Harmonizing process is regulated by an internal commission. The 
commission has a set series of definitions and standards that include the 
following: 
• Treatment of newly significant goods and services - all product types with 
a weight of at least on part per thousand should be covered 
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• Formula for the elementary aggregates - forbidding the use of arithmetic 
means of price relatives except where this can be shown not to affect 
comparability 
• Minimum standards for quality adjustment - explicit quality adjustments 
must be made whenever possible and the whole of a price change should never be 
ascribed to quality differences without justification 
• Sampling - the sample must be sufficiently representative of the products 
taking account of their price variability. The target sample must be maintained. 
• Initial coverage of the indices - all goods and services available on the 
domestic market except for a staged introduction of certain items and the specific 
exclusion of very few 
• Missing price observations - carrying forward the most recent observation 
for more than two months is not permitted 
• Geographical and population coverage - The HICPs cover purchases by 
households within the territory of a country, by both resident and non-resident 
consumers 
• Timing of inclusion of purchaser prices - prices for goods should be 
included in the HICP when they are observed, whereas prices for services should 
be entered for the month in which the consumption of the service can commence 
The Governing Council also claims they are intent on maintaining inflation rates 
very close to 2% (or below) in the near term. This is congruent with their strategy 
of keeping stable prices. With these facts in mind, this study will use 2% as the 
desired rate of inflation. 
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Rate of Inflation (nt) - The rate of inflation is commonly reported by monetary 
authorities. This study will use HICP statistics reported by Eurostat. 
Output Gap (yt) - This is a comparison of the actual GDP (output) of an 
economy and the potential GDP (efficient output). To calculate the output gap, 
the present study will take the monthly industrial production index and apply a 
Hodrick Prescott Filter to measure the output gap as a deviation of the logarithm 
of actual industrial production from its linear trend. The monthly industrial 
production index will be obtained from Eurostat. 
Methodology 
Using monthly data, the present study will calculate the coefficient on inflation 
(|3i) and the coefficient on the output gap (pY). A p-value will also be calculated 
for each. If the p-value is less than .1 then we will assume that inflation is 
targeted. Additionally, this study will analyze the coefficient on inflation and see 
what suggestions the model makes for interest rate movements. The current study 
will analyze whether the suggested rate movements are consistent with raising 
rates in a low inflation environment and lower rates in a high inflation 
environment. Finally, this study will conduct a simple analysis on the average 
inflation during the focus period to see if it is in line with the 2% target. 
The time series will begin with data from March of 2004 (when the new entrants 
became part of the EU) and end with March of 2007. It should be noted that 
reliable short term interest rates during the focus period could not be found for 
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Ireland, Spain, Estonia or Malta. As a result, the study will be limited to 10 of the 
original members (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France Germany, Greece, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Portugal) and 5 of the new entrants (Cyprus, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia). 
If the results of these statistical tests show that attention given to inflation was not 
consistent for the new entrants, yet fairly consistent for the original members then 
this study will argue that the ECB monetary policies were prejudiced. 
It should be noted that this study has focused on the period of March 2004 
through March 2007. Many changes continue to happen in the European Union 
that may deserve consideration in future studies. For example, on January 1 2007, 
the EU grew to 27 members with the addition of Bulgaria and Romania. On 
January 1 2007 Slovenia converged to the Euro currency and on January 1 2008, 
Cyprus and Malta converged. This brings the total number of countries on the 
Euro currency to 15. 
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CHAPTER IV 
ANALYSIS OF DATA - EURO AREA COUNTRIES 
Austria 
Variable 
Inflation 
Output Gap 
Coefficient 
-0.4438182 
0.353534 
Standard Error 
0.2646868 
5.153401 
P>|t| 
0.103 
0.946 
The analysis of Austria shows that the estimate of the coefficient on inflation is -
.444 with a standard error of .26. The estimate of the coefficient on the output 
gap is .353 with a standard error of 5.15. The probability of type I error is .103 
for inflation and .946 for the output gap. The null hypothesis that the output gap 
is zero is not rejected since its p-value of .946 is too high. This indicates that the 
monetary policies of the ECB are not compatible with output targeting for 
Austria. In the case of inflation, the .103 p-value hints the possibility of inflation 
targeting for Austria. A lower p-value would have made a more compelling case. 
It should be noted that during the period of March of 2004 through March of 
2007, Austria's inflation rate averaged 1.9% which is slightly below the 2% 
target. The coefficient on inflation suggests that in order to meet the 2% target, 
the fed fund interest rate should decline by 4.4 basis points. This figure is 
calculated by taking the difference between average inflation and the inflation 
target and then multiplying that figure by the coefficient on inflation (1.9-2-0.1; 
0.1* .4438= .044 or 4.4 basis points). Decreasing rates by 4.4 basis points is 
congruent with monetary policy theory to raise interest rates if inflation rises and 
decrease it otherwise. These numbers suggest that the ECB monetary policy 
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movements are addressing Austria's inflation to some extent with less focus on 
output activity. 
Belgium 
Variable 
Inflation 
Output Gap 
Coefficient 
0.7621078 
23.27978 
Standard Error 
0.2041799 
7.228126 
P>|t| 
0.001 
0.003 
The results for Belgium show that the estimate of the coefficient on inflation is 
.762 with a standard error of .204. The estimate of the coefficient on the output 
gap is 23.27 with a standard error of 7.23. The probability of type I error is .001 
for inflation and .003 for the output gap. The null hypothesis that the output gap 
is zero is rejected since its p-value of .033 is low enough. The conclusion is that 
the monetary policies set by the ECB are targeting Belgium's output. In the case 
of inflation, the null hypothesis that inflation is zero is rejected as a result of the 
.001 p-value. The conclusion is that the monetary policies of the ECB are 
targeting Belgium's inflation. It should be noted that during the period of March 
2004 through March of 2007, Belgium's inflation rate averaged 2.3% which is 
slightly above the 2% target. The coefficient on inflation suggests that in order to 
meet the 2% target, the federal funds interest rate should be raised by 23 basis 
points. This figured is calculated by taking the difference between average 
inflation and the inflation target and then multiplying that figure by the coefficient 
on inflation (2.3-2 = 0.3; 0.3*.7621 = .23 or 23 basis points). This is congruent 
with monetary policy theory to raise interest rates if inflation rises and decrease it 
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otherwise. In summary, these numbers suggest that the ECB monetary policy 
movements are broadly addressing Belgium's inflation rate. 
Finland 
Variable 
Inflation 
Output Gap 
Coefficient 
0.8398809 
3.907785 
Standard Error 
0.0905811 
3.429801 
P>|t| 
0.000 
0.000 
The results for Finland show that the estimate of the coefficient on inflation is 
.840 with a standard error of .091. The estimate of the coefficient on the output 
gap is 3.91 with a standard error of 3.43. The probability of type I error is .000 
for inflation and .000 for the output gap. The null hypothesis that the output gap 
is zero is rejected since its p-value of .000 is low enough. The conclusion is that 
the monetary policies set by the ECB are addressing Finland's output. In the case 
of inflation, the null hypothesis that inflation is zero is rejected as a result of the 
.000 p-value. The conclusion is that the monetary policies of the ECB are 
targeting Finland's inflation. It should be noted that during the period of March 
2004 through March of 2007, Finland's inflation rate averaged .8% which is 
significantly below the 2% target. The coefficient on inflation suggests that in 
order to meet the 2% target, the fed funds should be raised by 100.8 basis points. 
This figured is calculated by taking the difference between average inflation and 
the inflation target and then multiplying that figure by the coefficient on inflation 
(.8-2 = 1.2; 1.2*.8400 = 1.08 or 100.8 basis points). These numbers suggest that 
the ECB monetary policy movements are not broadly addressing Finland's 
monetary policy needs on two fronts. First, the coefficient on inflation suggests 
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that Finland needs an increase of 100.8 basis points to draw closer to the 2% 
target. This is not congruent with monetary policy theory to raise interest rates if 
inflation rises and decrease it otherwise. Second, Finland's .8% inflation rate is 
clearly well below the 2% target rate. 
France 
Variable 
Inflation 
Output Gap 
Coefficient 
-1.054981 
15.34892 
Standard Error 
0.2066926 
12.35808 
P>|t| 
0.000 
0.223 
The results for France show that the estimate of the coefficient on inflation is -
1.05 with a standard error of .207. The estimate of the coefficient on the output 
gap is 15.35 with a standard error of 12.36. The probability of type I error is .000 
for inflation and .223 for the output gap. The null hypothesis that the output gap 
is zero is not rejected since its p-value of .223 is too high. This indicates that the 
monetary policies of the ECB are not compatible with output targeting for France. 
In the case of inflation, the null hypothesis that inflation is zero is rejected as a 
result of the .000 p-value. The conclusion is that the monetary policies of the 
ECB are targeting France's inflation. It should be noted that during the period of 
March 2004 through March of 2007, France's inflation rate averaged 1.9% which 
is slightly below the 2% target. The coefficient on inflation suggests that in order 
to meet the 2% target, the federal funds interest rate should be lowered by 10.55 
basis points. This figured is calculated by taking the difference between average 
inflation and the inflation target and then multiplying that figure by the coefficient 
on inflation (2-1.9 = .1; .1*1.055 = .1055 or 10.55 basis points). Lowering rates 
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by 10.55 is congruent with monetary policy theory to raise interest rates if 
inflation rises and decrease it otherwise. With a .000 p-value and suggested rate 
movements in line it appears price stability was addressed for France. 
Germany 
Variable 
Inflation 
Output Gap 
Coefficient 
1.857339 
56.82288 
Standard Error 
0.4203635 
9.958614 
P>|t| 
0.000 
0.000 
The results for Germany show that the estimate of the coefficient on inflation is 
1.86 with a standard error of .420. The estimate of the coefficient on the output 
gap is 56.83 with a standard error of 9.96. The probability of type I error is .000 
for inflation and .000 for the output gap. The null hypothesis that the output gap 
is zero is rejected since its p-value of .000 is low enough. The conclusion is that 
the monetary policies set by the ECB are targeting Germany's output. In the case 
of inflation, the null hypothesis that inflation is zero is rejected as a result of the 
.000 p-value. The conclusion is that the monetary policies of the ECB are 
targeting Germany's inflation. It should be noted that during the period of March 
2004 through March of 2007, Germany's inflation rate averaged 2.1% which is 
slightly above the 2% target. The statistical tests suggest that in order to meet the 
2% target, interest rates should be raised 18.6 basis points. This figure is 
calculated by taking the difference between average inflation and the inflation 
target and then multiplying that figure by the coefficient on inflation (2.1-2 = .1; 
.1*1.8573 = . 1857 or 18.6 basis points). This is congruent with monetary policy 
theory to raise interest rates if inflation rises and decrease it otherwise. Overall, 
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these numbers suggest that the ECB monetary policy movements are broadly 
addressing Germany's monetary policy needs. Based on a .000 p-value for both 
inflation and output, coupled with an inflation rate very close to the 2% target, it 
appears the monetary policies of the ECB were focused on Germany's price 
stability. 
Greece 
Variable 
Inflation 
Output Gap 
Coefficient 
0.2153169 
6.025375 
Standard Error 
0.0726926 
1.853194 
P>|t| 
0.006 
0.003 
The results for Greece show that the estimate of the coefficient on inflation is .215 
with a standard error of .073. The estimate of the coefficient on the output gap is 
6.03 with a standard error of 1.85. The probability of type I error is .006 for 
inflation and .003 for the output gap. The null hypothesis that the output gap is 
zero is rejected since its p-value of .003 is low enough. The conclusion is that the 
monetary policies set by the ECB are targeting Greece's output. In the case of 
inflation, the null hypothesis that inflation is zero is rejected as a result of the .006 
p-value. The conclusion is that the monetary policies of the ECB are targeting 
Greece's inflation. It should be noted that during the period of March 2004 
through March of 2007, the average inflation rate was 3.3% which is above the 
2% target. The statistical tests suggest that in order to meet the 2% target, the 
federal funds interest rate should be raised by 4.3 basis points. This figure is 
calculated by taking the difference between average inflation and the inflation 
target and then multiplying that figure by the coefficient on inflation (2.2-.2 = .2; 
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.2*.2153 = .0431 or 4.3 basis points). This is congruent with monetary policy 
theory to raise interest rates if inflation rises and decrease it otherwise. These 
numbers suggest that the ECB monetary policy movements are broadly 
addressing Greece's inflation rate. 
Hall 
Variable 
Inflation 
Output Gap 
Coefficient 
-1.085696 
8.738223 
Standard Error 
0.7639414 
4.980256 
P>|t| 
0.165 
0.089 
The results for Italy show that the estimate of the coefficient on inflation is -1.09 
with a standard error of .764. The estimate of the coefficient on the output gap is 
8.74 with a standard error of 4.98. The probability of type I error is .165 for 
inflation and .089 for the output gap. The null hypothesis that the output gap is 
zero is rejected since its p-value of .089 is low enough. The conclusion is that the 
monetary policies set by the ECB are targeting Italy's output. In the case of 
inflation, the null hypothesis that inflation is zero is not rejected as a result of the 
.165 p-value. The conclusion is that the ECB is not targeting Italy's inflation. It 
should be noted that during the period of March 2004 through March of 2007, 
Italy's inflation averaged 2.2% which is above the 2% target. The statistical tests 
suggest that in order to meet the 2% target, the federal funds interest rate should 
be lowered by 22.8 basis points. This figure is calculated by taking the difference 
between average inflation and the inflation target and then multiplying that figure 
by the coefficient on inflation (2.21-.2 = .21; .21*1.086 = .2281 or 22.8 basis 
points). This is not congruent with monetary policy theory to raise interest rates 
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if inflation rises and decrease it otherwise. With a .165 p-value and a negative 
coefficient on inflation in a high inflation environment, it appears the monetary 
policy movements of the ECB did not address Italy's inflationary needs. 
Luxembourg 
Variable 
Inflation 
Output Gap 
Coefficient 
-0.0459816 
4.955861 
Standard Error 
0.1393401 
9.527037 
P>|t| 
0.743 
0.606 
The results for Luxembourg show that the estimate of the coefficient on inflation 
is -.046 with a standard error of .139. The estimate of the coefficient on the 
output gap is 4.95 with a standard error of 9.53. The probability of type I error is 
.743 for inflation and .606 for the output gap. The null hypothesis that the output 
gap is zero is not rejected since its p-value of .606 is too high. This indicates that 
the monetary policies of the ECB are not compatible with output targeting for 
Luxembourg. In the case of inflation, null hypothesis that inflation is zero is not 
rejected as a result of the .743 p-value. The conclusion is that the ECB is not 
targeting Luxembourg's inflation. It should be noted that during the period of 
March 2004 through March of 2007, Luxembourg's inflation averaged 1.4% 
which is below the 2% target. The statistical tests suggest that in order to meet 
the 2% target, the federal funds interest rate should be lowered by 2.7 basis 
points. This figure is calculated by taking the difference between average 
inflation and the inflation target and then multiplying that figure by the coefficient 
on inflation (1.41-2=.59; .59*.0460= .0271 or 2.7 basis points). This is not 
congruent with monetary policy theory to raise interest rates if inflation rises and 
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decrease it otherwise. Overall, these numbers suggest that the ECB monetary 
policy movements are not broadly addressing Luxembourg's inflationary needs. 
The Netherlands 
Variable 
Inflation 
Output Gap 
Coefficient 
1.917697 
-13.36207 
Standard Error 
0.2056847 
4.844014 
P>|t| 
0.000 
0.009 
The results for the Netherlands show that the estimate of the coefficient on 
inflation is 1.92 with a standard error of .206. The estimate of the coefficient on 
the output gap is -13.36 with a standard error of 4.84. The probability of type I 
error is .000 for inflation and .009 for the output gap. The null hypothesis that the 
output gap is zero is rejected since its p-value of .009 is low enough. The 
conclusion is that the monetary policies set by the ECB are targeting the 
Netherlands' output. In the case of inflation, the null hypothesis that inflation is 
zero is rejected as a result of the .000 p-value. The conclusion is that the ECB is 
targeting Luxembourg's inflation. It should be noted that during the period of 
March 2004 through March of 2007, the Netherlands inflation averaged 1.5% 
which is below the 2% target. The statistical tests suggest that in order to meet the 
2% target, the federal funds interest rate should be raised by 96 basis points. This 
figure is calculated by taking the difference between average inflation and the 
inflation target and then multiplying that figure by the coefficient on inflation 
(1.5-2=0.5; 0.5* .1.918= .9595 or 96.0 basis points). This is not congruent with 
monetary policy theory which calls for a central bank to lower rates if inflation is 
below the target. Overall, the statistical tests for the Netherlands give some 
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contradicting information. The .000 p-value suggests that inflation is targeted 
however, the statistical tests suggest that rates should be increased by 96 basis 
points despite having an interest rate below the target. These numbers suggest 
that the ECB monetary policy movements are not broadly addressing Netherlands 
inflationary needs. 
Portugal 
Variable 
Inflation 
Output Gap 
Coefficient 
0.2996022 
2.930499 
Standard Error 
0.08158 
3.255217 
P>|t| 
0.001 
0.375 
The results for Portugal show that the estimate of the coefficient on inflation is 
.2996 with a standard error of .0816. The estimate of the coefficient on the output 
gap is 2.93 with a standard error of 3.25. The probability of type I error is .001 
for inflation and .375 for the output gap. The null hypothesis that the output gap is 
zero is not rejected since its p-value of .375 is too high. This indicates that the 
monetary policies of the ECB are not compatible with output targeting for 
Portugal. In the case of inflation, the null hypothesis that inflation is zero is 
rejected as a result of the .001 p-value. The conclusion is that the monetary 
policies of the ECB are targeting Portugal's inflation. It should be noted that 
during the period of March of 2004 through March of 2007, Portugal's inflation 
rate average 2.6% which is above the 2% target. The statistical tests suggest that 
in order to meet the 2% target, the fed fund interest rate should rise by 3.0 basis 
points. This figure is calculated by taking the difference between average inflation 
and the inflation target and then multiplying that figure by the coefficient on 
60 
inflation (2.6-2=0.6; 0.6* .2996= .1798 or 18 basis points). This is congruent 
with monetary policy theory to raise interest rates if inflation rises and decrease it 
otherwise. With a .001 p-value and appropriate interests rate adjustments in 
place, it appears that the monetary policy movements of the ECB are addressing 
Portugal's inflationary needs. 
Data Analysis - New Entrants 
Cyprus 
Variable 
Inflation 
Output Gap 
Coefficient 
-0.0616624 
5.200136 
Standard Error 
0.023862 
3.952401 
P>|t| 
0.014 
0.197 
The results for Cyprus show that the estimate of the coefficient on inflation is -
.062 with a standard error of .239. The estimate of the coefficient on the output 
gap is 5.20 with a standard error of 3.95. The probability of type I error is .0014 
for inflation and .197 for the output gap. The null hypothesis that the output gap 
is zero is not rejected since its p-value of. 197 is too high. This indicates that the 
monetary policies of the ECB are not compatible with output targeting for 
Cyprus. In the case of inflation, the null hypothesis that inflation is zero is 
rejected as a result of the .014 p-value. The conclusion is that the monetary 
policies of the ECB are targeting Cyprus' inflation. It should be noted that during 
the period of March 2004 through March of 2007, Cyprus' inflation rate averaged 
2% which is right at the 2% target. The statistical tests suggest that in order to 
keep the rates at the 2% target, the federal funds interest rate should not be 
adjusted. This figure is calculated by taking the difference between average 
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inflation and the inflation target and then multiplying that figure by the coefficient 
on inflation (2-2=0.0; 0.0* .0617= 0.0 basis points). No movement in interest 
rates is understandable with inflation at the 2% target. In summary, these 
numbers suggest that the ECB monetary policy movements are broadly 
addressing inflation for Cyprus. 
Latvia 
Variable 
Inflation 
Output Gap 
Coefficient 
0.1984232 
-23.15546 
Standard Error 
0.0736318 
4.214372 
P>|t| 
0.011 
0.000 
The results for Latvia show that the estimate of the coefficient on inflation is .198 
with a standard error of .074. The estimate of the coefficient on the output gap is 
-23.16 with a standard error of 4.21. The probability of type I error is .011 for 
inflation and .000 for the output gap. The null hypothesis that the output gap is 
zero is rejected since its p-value of .000 is low enough. The conclusion is that the 
monetary policies set by the ECB are targeting Latvia's output. In the case of 
inflation, the null hypothesis that inflation is zero is rejected as a result of the .011 
p-value. The conclusion is that the monetary policies of the ECB are targeting 
Latvia's inflation. It should be noted that during the period of March 2004 
through March of 2007, the average inflation rate was 6.8% which is well above 
the 2% target. The statistical tests suggest that in order to meet the 2% target, the 
federal funds interest rate should be raised by 720 basis points. This figure is 
calculated by taking the difference between average inflation and the inflation 
target and then multiplying that figure by the coefficient on inflation (6.8-2=4.8; 
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4.8* .1984= 7.206 or 721 basis points). This is not congruent with the monetary 
policy theory which calls for a central bank to lower rates if inflation is below the 
target. These numbers suggest that the ECB monetary policy movements are not 
broadly addressing Latvia's inflationary needs. With the ECB's stated focus on 
price stability, it appears that the monetary policy movements were not fair for 
Latvia. 
Lithuania 
Variable 
Inflation 
Output Gap 
Coefficient 
0.0289575 
-0.0164452 
Standard Error 
0.0024816 
0.1523922 
P>|t| 
0.000 
0.915 
The analysis of Lithuania shows that the estimate of the coefficient on inflation is 
.290 with a standard error of .002. The estimate of the coefficient on the output 
gap is -.016 with a standard error of .152. The probability of type I error is .000 
for inflation and .915 for the output gap. The null hypothesis that the output gap 
is zero is not rejected since its p-value of .915 is too high. This indicates that the 
monetary policies of the ECB are not compatible with output targeting for 
Lithuania. In the case of inflation, the null hypothesis that inflation is zero is 
rejected as a result of the .000 p-value. The conclusion is that the monetary 
policies of the ECB are targeting Lithuania's inflation. It should be noted that 
during the period of.March of 2004 through March of 2007, Lithuania's inflation 
averaged 2.9% which is above the 2% target. The statistical tests suggest that in 
order to meet the 2% target, the federal funds interest rate should be raised by 2.6 
basis points. This figure is calculated by taking the difference between average 
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inflation and the inflation target and then multiplying that figure by the coefficient 
on inflation (2.9-2=0.9; 0.9* .0290= .0261 or 2.6 basis points). This is congruent 
with monetary policy theory to raise interest rates if inflation rises and decrease it 
otherwise. With a .000 p-value and appropriate interest rate movements in place, 
it appears that the ECB is addressing the inflationary needs of Lithuania. 
Slovakia 
Variable 
Inflation 
Output Gap 
Coefficient 
-0.0274653 
32.05663 
Standard Error 
0.0540875 
4.668737 
P>|t| 
0.615 
0.000 
The results for Slovakia show that the estimate of the coefficient on inflation is -
.0275 with a standard error of .0541. The estimate of the coefficient on the output 
gap is 32.06 with a standard error of 4.669. The probability of type I error is .615 
for inflation and .000 for the output gap. The null hypothesis that the output gap 
is zero is rejected since its p-value of .000 is low enough. The conclusion is that 
the monetary policies set by the ECB are targeting Slovakia's output. The null 
hypothesis that inflation is zero is not rejected since its p-value of .615 is too high. 
This indicates that the monetary policies of the ECB are not compatible with 
inflation targeting for Slovakia. It should be noted that during the period of 
March 2004 through March of 2007, Slovakia's inflation averaged 4.4% which is 
well above the 2% target. The statistical tests suggest that in order to meet the 2% 
target, the federal funds interest rate should be lowered by 0.3 basis points. This 
figure is calculated by taking the difference between average inflation and the 
inflation target and then multiplying that figure by the coefficient on inflation 
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(4.4-2=2.4; 2.4* .0275= .066 or 6.6 basis points). However, with a standard 
error (.054) larger than the coefficient on inflation (.0275) it is inconclusive on 
whether rates should be raised or lowered. These numbers suggest that ECB 
monetary policy movements are not broadly addressing Slovakia's inflation needs 
on two fronts. First, the .615 p-test suggests that inflation is not targeted. Second, 
an average inflation rate of 4.4% is clearly well above the 2% target. These 
numbers suggest that the ECB was not addressing Slovakia's inflationary needs. 
Slovenia 
Variable 
Inflation 
Output Gap 
Coefficient 
0.8838902 
-0.6783797 
Standard Error 
0.1799559 
7.965044 
P>|t| 
0.000 
0.933 
The analysis of Slovenia shows that the estimate of the coefficient on inflation is 
.8840 with a standard error of .1800. The estimate of the coefficient on the output 
gap is -.6784 with a standard error of 7.965. The probability of type I error is 
.000 for inflation and .933 for the output gap. The null hypothesis that the output 
gap is zero is not rejected since its p-value of .933 is too high. This indicates that 
the monetary policies of the ECB are not compatible with output targeting for 
Slovenia. In the case of inflation, the null hypothesis that inflation is zero is 
rejected as a result of the .000 p-value. The conclusion is that the monetary 
policies of the ECB are targeting Slovenia's inflation. It should be noted that 
during the period of March of 2004 through March of 2007, Slovenia's inflation 
averaged 2.8% which is above the 2% target. The statistical tests suggest that in 
order to meet the 2% target, the federal funds interest rate should be raised by 
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70.7 basis points. This figure is calculated by taking the difference between 
average inflation and the inflation target and then multiplying that figure by the 
coefficient on inflation (2.8-2=.8; .8* .8840= .7072 or 70.7 basis points). This is 
congruent with monetary policy theory to raise interest rates if inflation rises and 
decrease it otherwise. With a .000 p-value and appropriate interests rate 
adjustments in place, it appears that the monetary policy movements of the ECB 
are addressing Slovenia's inflationary needs. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
The present study explored whether the ECB had proper focus on price stability 
for all countries in the Euro-area community. Using economic indicators for each 
country and the funds rate of the ECB, the current study used the Taylor Rule to 
test whether the ECB focused on price stability for both old and new member 
countries. The research sought to answer the following question. During the 
period of March 2004 through March 2007, did the Taylor Rule apply to old and 
new member countries in the Euro-Area? 
Based on the analysis, it appears that the Taylor rule did not apply for all 
countries. As a result, it appears that the ECB did not have proper focus on 
inflation for all countries in the Euro-area. Additionally, the 2% inflation goal 
was not reached by all countries. In fact the only country that average 2% during 
the focus period was Cyprus - one of the new entrants. Ten countries in the 
current study were within 150 basis points of the 2 percent target, however 2 of 
the new entrant countries (Latvia and Slovenia) were well above the 2 percent 
target. The table below shows the average inflation for all countries in the study. 
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Euro Area Countries 
Austria* 
Belgium 
Finland 
France* 
Germany* 
Greece* 
Italy* 
Luxembourg 
The Netherlands 
Portugal 
* Executive Board Seat 
New Entrants 
Cyprus 
Lativa 
Lithuania 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
Average Inflation Rate 
1.9 
2.3 
0.8 
1.9 
2.1 
3.3 
2.2 
1.4 
1.5 
2.6 
2.0 
6.8 
2.9 
4.4 
2.8 
Once again, a breakdown of the 18 votes cast for monetary policy during the 
focus period shows that Austria, France, Germany, Greece, Italy and Spain each 
had 2 votes; Finland, Portugal, Ireland, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and 
Belgium each had 1 vote; and the new entrants had zero votes. It is interesting to 
note that Austria, France and Germany were within 10 basis points of the 2% 
target. These 3 countries each had 2 votes on how monetary policies were set. 
In order to test whether monetary policy movements were focused on price 
stability, the current study used a version of the Taylor Rule similar to the model 
use by Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1997). In order to estimate coefficients on 
inflation (Pi) and the output gap (|32), the current study used a Generalized 
Method of Moments. A p-value was also calculated for each country to obtain the 
probability getting a result at least as extreme as a given data point under the null 
hypothesis. If the p-value was less than .1 for inflation then it was assumed that 
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inflation was targeted. If the p-value was less than .1 for the output gap then it 
was assumed that output was targeted. Under the null, the ECB would be 
consistent with its focus on "price stability" where inflation is targeted. 
Additionally, this study analyzed the coefficient on inflation to see whether the 
suggested rate movements were consistent with raising rates in a low inflation 
environment and lower rates in a high inflation environment. 
The analysis of each country ended with a conclusion on whether the ECB had 
proper focus on price stability. A summary of the results are displayed in the 
following chart. 
Euro Area Countries 
Austria* 
Belgium 
Finland 
France* 
Germany* 
Greece* 
Italy* 
Luxembourg 
The Netherlands 
Portugal 
* Executive Board Seat 
New Entrants 
Cyprus 
Lativa 
Lithuania 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
Focused on Price 
Stability 
•/ 
V 
s 
• / 
y 
V 
s 
s 
s 
Not Focused on Price 
Stability 
v 
s 
s 
S 
V 
• / 
Overall, the statistical tests using the Taylor Rule showed some mixed results. 
The analysis showed that 6 out of 10 Euro Area Countries and 3 out of 5 new 
entrants had proper focus on price stability. It is interesting to note that 4 out of 5 
countries with executive board seats had proper focus on price stability. 
Additionally, 4 out of 5 countries with board seats had inflation rates within 20 
basis points of the 2 percent target. 
Why did some countries have proper focus on inflation while others did not? 
Germany's long standing influence may explain why they had proper focus on 
price stability. As the largest economy in the Euro-area, it is important to make 
sure that their economic needs are met. All voting members of the ECB 
understand this. The ECB, located in Frankfurt, was modeled after the 
Bundesbank and consequently Germany has always had significant influence on 
monetary policy decisions. Conversely, the lack of history and influence for new 
entrants like Latvia and Slovakia makes them subject to policy decisions 
influenced by the more powerful countries in the Euro-area. Not having voting 
rights for monetary policy may also be a reason why their inflation was not 
properly addressed. Alternatively, there are countries that achieved monetary 
policy goals despite not having a strong influence or any voting rights. For 
example, Cyprus was the lone country to meet the 2% target during the focus 
period despite being a new entrant with no votes. They were the beneficiary of 
monetary policies that arbitrarily worked in their favor. 
Overall, the ECB has primarily focused on the largest, most influential 
economies. Smaller economies either suffer from the lack of focus on their 
inflation or they can get lucky to have inflation at proper levels without intention. 
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This needs to change. The ECB should understand that too much focus on the 
large economies and limited focus on the smaller new entrants becomes 
detrimental to the Euro-area as a whole. Research shows that all major 
contractions in the economy, including the great depression, came during a period 
of economic instability (Friedman and Schwartz 1963, Bernanke 1983, and 
Mishkin 1991). The financial crisis and economic downturn in Mexico and East 
Asia also support this view (Mishkin 1996, and Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini 
1998). If the monetary policy needs of certain countries in the Euro-area are 
neglected in favor of the monetary policy needs of other countries, then the 
possibility exists for major contractions in the economies of countries being 
neglected. This is not good for these individual countries or for the European 
Union as a whole. The 1997 Asian Crisis is a good example of how the 
deteriorating financial conditions of a country can have a spill over affect and 
cause greater problems throughout a region. The Asian crisis started in Thailand 
in July 1997 when the national currency collapsed. The collapse was in large part 
due to a severe downturn in the Thai real estate market and the large amount of 
foreign debt that almost left Thailand bankrupt. The Thai government tried to 
correct the downturn by cutting its peg to the US dollar and allowing the national 
currency to float. The currency continued to devalue and this severely impacted 
import revenue, resulting in a further economic downturn. Two important 
regional trading partners, Indonesia and South Korea, also became seriously 
affected by Thailand's downturn. Additionally, Hong Kong, the Phillipines and 
Malasia experienced a devaluation of their currencies to the US dollar. These 
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devaluations throughout East Asia contributed to many financial woes including 
business collapses, stock market crashes, and political unrest. The Asian crisis is 
a good example of why it is important to keep financial stability in a region. The 
19 neighboring countries in the Euro-area are regional trading partners. The ECB 
needs to foster economic health for all countries in the Euro-area to assure 
financial stability in the entire region. 
One of the biggest challenges for the ECB is the implementation of policies that 
keep all countries economically healthy. Similarities can be pointed out with the 
United States Federal Reserve as they try to meet the economic needs of all 50 
states. Unfortunately, certain economic policies may be good for one state but not 
good for another state. For example, the housing industry in Florida hit record 
highs during 2004. According to statistics released by the Office of Federal 
Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO), the increase in average house prices for 
Florida was 18.79% during fiscal 2004. That Was almost double the growth rate 
averaged over the previous 5 years. The fast increase in values during 2004 
caused the prices to be heavily inflated and this attributed to a severe downfall 
when the market turned in 2006 and 2007. According to the OFHEO, Florida's 
average home price decreased by almost 5% during fiscal 2007. The number of 
new home sales also decreased by 15% from 2006 to 2007. This downturn in the 
housing market had a rippling effect on many other industries and caused serious 
problems with the Florida economy. For example, Florida has a heavy 
concentration in the assisted living facility (ALF) industry as a result of the older 
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population. The ALF industry became suppressed because elder individuals who 
were candidates for an ALF could not sell their homes. As a result they stayed 
longer in their current homes aided by family members who pitched in to help 
until their homes could be sold. With fewer residents moving into ALFs, the 
industry saw reduced revenues resulting in lay offs, lost wages and reduced 
consumer spending. This is just one example of the rippling affect from the 
depressed housing industry in Florida. There are many more industries that were 
similarly affected by the real estate slow down. According to the Florida 
Manufacturing Extension Partnership, the state lost over 5,000 manufacturing 
jobs in 2006 as result of Florida's economic slowdown. According to the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics, the Department Store industry witnessed the largest drop in 
employment among all Florida industries. A total of 18,775 jobs were lost 
between 2003 and 2007. Overall, the Florida economy was in a severe downturn 
by the end of 2007 fueled by a severe drop in the housing sector. To help bolster 
this downturn in the economy, Florida needed rate cuts from the United States 
Federal Reserve. 
In a complete contrast to Florida, Utah was one of the isolated areas in the United 
States that saw an increase in the housing sector during 2006 and 2007. 
According to the OFHEO, Utah led the country with a 13% increase in average 
home prices during fiscal 2007 compared to Florida's 5% decrease during the 
same period. According to the Utah Association of Realtors, 25,000 new 
households were formed in Utah during 2007. This resulted in Utah's population 
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increasing 3.2% from 2006 to 2007. This increase is the highest growth rate Utah 
has experienced during the past 15 years. As a result of the increasing resident 
base, Utah experienced increased house prices and increased spending at local 
businesses. To control the potential for higher inflation as a result of increased 
economic activity, Utah would benefit from stable interest rates or possibly even 
higher interest rates. This would help them control growth and potentially keep 
them off the path that Florida followed when they grew too fast during 2003-
2004. Unfortunately the United State Federal Reserve has a monetary policy 
system that addresses the economic needs for the United States as whole. It is not 
possible to raise rates for Utah and lower rates for Florida. During fiscal year 
2007 the Fed actually chose to lower rates by 100 basis points. This was not 
because Utah had no votes on how monetary policy should be set nor was it 
because Florida had significant influence with the Federal Reserve. This is the 
result of the Fed acting upon what is best for the United States economy as a 
whole. Unlike Utah, most states had deteriorating economic conditions so the Fed 
acted on what was best for the majority of the United States. 
The challenges facing the European Central Bank are similar to the challenges 
facing the United States Federal Reserve. The ECB has 19 countries that are 
dependent on their policies and these countries all have diverse economies. As a 
result, the ECB is faced with the difficult situation of trying to meet the economic 
needs of all countries. The influence of Germany and France will continue to be 
strong because the Euro-area economy depends on their success. Additionally, 
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the countries with 2 votes may still lean toward meeting the needs of their own 
countries. However, it is imperative that the new entrants have a strong voice to 
assure that their economic conditions have some bearing on monetary policy 
decisions. The ECB will always have a significant focus on the larger economies 
however, reverting back to the Asian Crisis example, it is important for all 
economies in the region to be healthy and the ECB needs to take note of this. 
The ECB should pay attention to the current research data which shows that 
Finland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Lithuania and Slovakia do not have 
proper focus on inflation. To ensure that these countries are getting proper 
attention, one suggestion would be to allow the new entrants to vote on monetary 
policy once they become part of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM II). As 
stated earlier, new entrants need to be part of the ERM II for at least two years 
prior to adopting the Euro. Participation in the ERM II includes shadowing 
monetary policy movements of the ECB. Participation also means meeting 
financial and economic convergence criteria which includes pegging the national 
currency to the Euro. Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Slovakia and 
Slovenia are all currently in the ERM II. Allowing these countries to vote on 
monetary policy will ensure that their economies get at least some focus when 
monetary policies are set. 
If the new entrants are given voting rights, this might also entice the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Poland to speed up their efforts to get on the Euro 
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currency. Poland's average inflation rate during the period of March 2004 
through March 2007 was 2.3%. They fought off high inflation during to 2004 and 
2005 and have made noticeable improvement since then. From January 2006 to 
March 2007 their annual inflation rate averaged .41%. They are currently 
operating in good economic conditions and they lack the necessary incentives to 
get on the Euro at this time. It is hard to disagree with their position. They 
currently have the freedom to peg the Euro or they have the ability to float. 
Obviously getting on the Euro would foster long term stability for their national 
currency but having the ability to implement their own independent monetary 
policies still remains enticing given their current economic success. If the ECB 
would give ERM II members a vote on how monetary policies are set, the idea of 
getting on the Euro sooner than later becomes more compelling for countries like 
Poland. Additionally, having all countries in the region on a single currency and 
giving all economies proper focus on price stability will make the ECB most 
valuable. 
In summary, the results of the present study show that monetary policies set by 
the ECB focused on price stability for Germany, France, Austria, Belgium, 
Greece, Portugal, Cyprus, Lithuania and Slovenia. However, Latvia, Slovakia, 
Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands did not have proper focus on price 
stability. In some instances the monetary policy results were intended. This is 
true for Germany as result of their economic importance to the Euro-area. For 
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others it was pure circumstance like Cyprus who was the lone country to average 
2% during the focus period despite being a new entrant with no votes. 
Deciphering what policies were intended is not the important issue. What's 
important is the issue of awareness. It is important for the ECB to be aware that 
Finland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Latvia and Slovakia did not have 
proper focus on inflation. Being aware of the results of this study and 
understanding the needs of all countries will help the ECB with the very difficult 
task of setting balanced monetary policies. This balance will foster economic 
health for the Euro-area as a whole. Having 19 strong economies is important to 
the overall economic health of the region and history shows that each country 
needs stability in their region to help ensure their own economic health. The 
smaller economies need to make sure that the ECB is aware of their economic 
needs. Likewise, the influential countries, especially countries with extra votes, 
need to realize that economic downturns for their regional trading partners in the 
Euro-area can have a rippling affect. A joint awareness of the economic needs of 
all countries will help the ECB and Euro-area countries make monetary policy 
decisions that foster economic health and unity for the Euro-area as a whole. 
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Appendix 1: Taylor Rule Variables for Original European Union 
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7. Italy 
84 
Actual ECB 
Italy | 
3/31/2004 
4/30/2004 
5/31/2004 
6/30/2004 
7/31/2004 
8/31/2004 
9/30/2004 
10/31/2004 
11/30/2004 
12/31/2004 
1/31/2005 
2/28/2005 
3/31/2005 
4/30/2005 
5/31/2005 
6/30/2005 
7/31/2005 
8/31/2005 
9/30/2005 
10/31/2005 
11/30/2005 
12/31/2005 
1/31/2006 
2/28/2006 
3/31/2006 
4/30/2006 
5/31/2006 
6/30/2006 
7/31/2006 
8/31/2006 
9/30/2006 
10/31/2006 
11/30/2006 
12/31/2006 
1/31/2007 
2/28/2007 
3/31/2007 
Rate 
3.0000 
3.0000 
3.0000 
3.0000 
3.0000 
3.0000 
3.0000 
3.0000 
3.0000 
3.0000 
3.0000 
3.0000 
3.0000 
3.0000 
3.0000 
3.0000 
3.0000 
3.0000 
3.0000 
3.0000 
3.0000 
3.2500 
3.2500 
3.2500 
3.5000 
3.5000 
3.5000 
3.7500 
3.7500 
4.0000 
4.0000 
4.2500 
4.2500 
4.5000 
4.5000 
4.5000 
4.7500 
nt - Inflation 
2.3 
2.3 
2.3 
2.4 
2.3 
2.4 
2.2 
2.1 
2.1 
2.4 
2 
2 
2.2 
2.1 
2.3 
2.1 
2.1 
2.1 
2.2 
2.6 
2.4 
2.1 
2.2 
2.2 
2.2 
2.3 
2.3 
2.4 
2.3 
2.3 
2.4 
1.9 
2 
2.1 
1.9 
2.1 
2.1 
Industrial 
t -shortterm Production 
;al rate 
0.68 
0.67 
0.67 
0.68 
0.66 
0.67 
0.69 
0.69 
0.70 
0.71 
0.70 
0.68 
0.70 
0.70 
0.71 
0.70 
0.69 
0.71 
0.72 
0.72 
0.74 
0.77 
0.79 
0.80 
0.86 
0.87 
0.89 
0.92 
0.93 
0.98 
1.02 
1.07 
1.11 
1.16 
0.12 
1.24 
1.31 
nt* ECB 2% 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
Index 
97.17 
97.20 
97.14 
96.99 
96.76 
96.51 
96.43 
96.22 
95.72 
95.30 
95.19 
95.25 
95.47 
95.72 
95.77 
95.87 
96.20 
96.36 
96.23 
96.17 
96.42 
96.79 
97.14 
97.43 
97.57 
97.69 
97.94 
98.13 
98.27 
98.43 
98.61 
98.89 
99.25 
99.40 
99.17 
98.87 
98.73 
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Appendix 2: Taylor Rule Variables for New Entrants to the 
European Union 
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1. Cyprus 
Cyprus 
3/31/2004 
4/30/2004 
5/31/2004 
6/30/2004 
7/31/2004 
8/31/2004 
9/30/2004 
10/31/2004 
11/30/2004 
12/31/2004 
1/31/2005 
2/28/2005 
3/31/2005 
4/30/2005 
5/31/2005 
6/30/2005 
7/31/2005 
8/31/2005 
9/30/2005 
10/31/2005 
11/30/2005 
12/31/2005 
1/31/2006 
2/28/2006 
3/31/2006 
4/30/2006 
5/31/2006 
6/30/2006 
7/31/2006 
8/31/2006 
9/30/2006 
10/31/2006 
11/30/2006 
12/31/2006 
1/31/2007 
2/28/2007 
3/31/2007 
Actual ECB 
Rate 
3.0000 
3.0000 
3.0000 
3.0000 
3.0000 
3.0000 
3.0000 
3.0000 
3.0000 
3.0000 
3.0000 
3.0000 
3.0000 
3.0000 
3.0000 
3.0000 
3.0000 
3.0000 
3.0000 
3.0000 
3.0000 
3.2500 
3.2500 
3.2500 
3.5000 
3.5000 
3.5000 
3.7500 
3.7500 
4.0000 
4.0000 
4.2500 
4.2500 
4.5000 
4.5000 
4.5000 
4.7500 
nt - Inflation 
0.1 
0.1 
1.2 
2.4 
2.9 
2.8 
1.8 
2.0 
2.6 
3.9 
2.8 
2.4 
2.4 
2.7 
2.1 
1.5 
1.3 
1.5 
2.1 
2.2 
2.0 
1.4 
2.0 
2.3 
2.6 
2.5 
2.5 
2.6 
2.8 
2.7 
2.2 
1.7 
1.3 
1.5 
1.4 
1.2 
1.4 
^ t - short term 
real rate 
0.44 
0.42 
0.69 
0.66 
0.66 
0.67 
0.66 
0.66 
0.64 
0.63 
0.66 
0.67 
0.65 
0.64 
0.55 
0.39 
0.42 
0.45 
0.46 
0.47 
0.46 
0.45 
0.46 
0.45 
0.47 
0.48 
0.47 
0.43 
0.46 
0.46 
0.55 
0.51 
0.5 
0.51 
0.54 
0.53 
0.53 
TTt* ECB 2% 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
Industrial 
Production 
Index 
110.24 
110.06 
109.83 
109.62 
109.45 
109.38 
109.52 
109.80 
110.04 
110.24 
110.43 
110.58 
110.67 
110.66 
110.57 
110.53 
110.60 
110.72 
110.79 
110.84 
110.89 
110.90 
110.89 
110.86 
110.85 
110.97 
111.22 
111.48 
111.76 
112.09 
112.39 
112.60 
112.82 
113.01 
113.16 
113.36 
113.64 
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4. Slovakia 
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Slovakia 
3/31/2004 
4/30/2004 
5/31/2004 
6/30/2004 
7/31/2004 
8/31/2004 
9/30/2004 
10/31/2004 
11/30/2004 
12/31/2004 
1/31/2005 
2/28/2005 
3/31/2005 
4/30/2005 
5/31/2005 
6/30/2005 
7/31/2005 
8/31/2005 
9/30/2005 
10/31/2005 
11/30/2005 
12/31/2005 
1/31/2006 
2/28/2006 
3/31/2006 
4/30/2006 
5/31/2006 
6/30/2006 
7/31/2006 
8/31/2006 
9/30/2006 
10/31/2006 
11/30/2006 
12/31/2006 
1/31/2007 
2/28/2007 
3/31/2007 
Actual ECB 
Rate 
3.0000 
3.0000 
3.0000 
3.0000 
3.0000 
3.0000 
3.0000 
3.0000 
3.0000 
3.0000 
3.0000 
3.0000 
3.0000 
3.0000 
3.0000 
3.0000 
3.0000 
3.0000 
3.0000 
3.0000 
3.0000 
3.2500 
3.2500 
3.2500 
3.5000 
3.5000 
3.5000 
3.7500 
3.7500 
4.0000 
4.0000 
4.2500 
4.2500 
4.5000 
4.5000 
4.5000 
4.7500 
t - short term 
8.0 
7.9 
8.2 
8.2 
8.4 
7.1 
6.6 
6.6 
6.3 
5.8 
3.2 
2.7 
2.4 
2.7 
2.4 
2.6 
2.1 
2.1 
2.3 
3.5 
3.6 
3.9 
4.1 
4.3 
4.3 
4.4 
4.8 
4.5 
5.0 
5.0 
4.5 
3.1 
3.7 
3.7 
2.2 
2.0 
2.1 
5.37 
4.65 
3.92 
3.64 
3.53 
3.74 
3.67 
3.64 
4.05 
2.92 
3.94 
2.25 
1.72 
1.96 
2.59 
2.46 
2.22 
2.68 
2.41 
2.25 
2.07 
2.49 
2.45 
2.44 
2.8 
3.04 
2.7 
4.21 
3.53 
3.8 
4.54 
4.28 
3.72 
4.73 
3.18 
5.25 
3.44 
Industrial 
Production 
nt* ECB 2% Index 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
124.00 
123.90 
124.00 
124.00 
123.90 
124.20 
124.50 
124.60 
124.70 
124.80 
125.10 
125.30 
125.50 
126.00 
126.50 
127.10 
128.00 
129.00 
129.90 
130.80 
131.90 
132.90 
133.90 
135.00 
136.40 
137.70 
139.30 
140.90 
142.50 
143.90 
145.00 
145.90 
147.30 
149.40 
151.80 
153.80 
155.50 
5. Slovenia 
93 
Slovenia 
3/31/2004 
4/30/2004 
5/31/2004 
6/30/2004 
7/31/2004 
8/31/2004 
9/30/2004 
10/31/2004 
11/30/2004 
12/31/2004 
1/31/2005 
2/28/2005 
3/31/2005 
4/30/2005 
5/31/2005 
6/30/2005 
7/31/2005 
8/31/2005 
9/30/2005 
10/31/2005 
11/30/2005 
12/31/2005 
1/31/2006 
2/28/2006 
3/31/2006 
4/30/2006 
5/31/2006 
6/30/2006 
7/31/2006 
8/31/2006 
9/30/2006 
10/31/2006 
11/30/2006 
12/31/2006 
1/31/2007 
2/28/2007 
3/31/2007 
Actual ECB 
Rate 
3.0000 
3.0000 
3.0000 
3.0000 
3.0000 
3.0000 
3.0000 
3.0000 
3.0000 
3.0000 
3.0000 
3.0000 
3.0000 
3.0000 
3.0000 
3.0000 
3.0000 
3.0000 
3.0000 
3.0000 
3.0000 
3.2500 
3.2500 
3.2500 
3.5000 
3.5000 
3.5000 
3.7500 
3.7500 
4.0000 
4.0000 
4.2500 
4.2500 
4.5000 
4.5000 
4.5000 
4.7500 
nt - Inflation 
3.5 
3.6 
3.9 
3.9 
3.7 
3.7 
3.4 
3.4 
3.8 
3.3 
2.3 
2.8 
3.3 
2.7 
2.1 
1.7 
2.0 
1.8 
3.2 
3.2 
2.1 
2.4 
2.6 
2.3 
2.0 
2.8 
3.4 
3.0 
1.9 
3.1 
2.5 
1.5 
2.4 
3.0 
2.8 
2.3 
2.6 
W - short term 
real rate 
3.6 
3.72 
3.6 
3.72 
3.6 
3.6 
3.72 
3.6 
3.72 
3.6 
3.59 
3.98 
2.38 
3.71 
2.38 
2.46 
2.38 
2.38 
2.46 
3.59 
3.71 
2.38 
2.38 
2.64 
2.38 
2.46 
2.38 
3.71 
2.38 
2.38 
3.71 
2.38 
1.22 
2.38 
2.38 
2.64 
2.38 
TTt* ECB 2% 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
Industrial 
Production 
Index 
110.53 
110.66 
110.78 
111.09 
111.47 
111.76 
111.83 
111.65 
111.44 
111.40 
111.59 
112.03 
112.81 
113.80 
114.74 
115.51 
115.95 
116.23 
116.78 
117.57 
118.40 
118.97 
119.13 
119.16 
119.53 
120.47 
121.62 
122.61 
123.61 
124.62 
125.52 
126.46 
127.54 
128.51 
129.13 
129.64 
130.25 
94 
REFERENCES 
Abu-Rashed, Jamal, Cameron, Lance. "Managing Currency Bands and the Future 
of European Monetary Integration." Management Decision, 1995, Vol. 33 Issue 2, 
p 22-31. 
Anderson, David, Sweeney, Dennis, and Williams, Thomas 2005. Statistics for 
Business and Economics, Thomson Southwestern, Mason Ohio. 
Amato, Jeffrey, and Laubach, Thomas. 1999. The Value of Interest Rate 
Smoothing: How the Private Sector Helps the Federal Reserve. Federal Reserve 
Bank of Kansas City Economic Review, Third Quarter, 1999. 
Bernanke, Ben. 1983. "Non-Monetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the 
Propagation of the Great Depression." American Economic Review, Vol 73, p 
257-276. 
Bofinger, Peter. 2002. "Lessons and Challenges." Paper Prepared for the 
Economic Analysis Division of the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Europe. Discussion Paper Series No. 3, February 2002. 
Bruess. 2005. Challenges for a Central Bank in an Enlarged EMU. SpringerWien 
Publishing, p 71-94. 
Carlstrom, Charles, and Fuerst, Timothy. 2000. "Forward-looking versus 
Backward-looking Taylor Rule." Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland Working 
Paper, No. 9 Working Paper, 2000, http://www.clevelandfed.org/. 
Clarida, Richard, Gali, Jordi, and Gertler, Mark. 1997. "Monetary Policy Rules in 
Practice: Some International Evidence." European Economic Review, Vol 42, p 
1033-1067. 
Clarida, Richard, Gali, Jordi, and Gertler, Mark. 1999. "The Science of Monetary 
Policy." Journal of Economic Literature, Vol 37, Issue 4, p 1661-1707. 
Corsetti, Giorgio, Pesenti, Paolo, and Roubini, Noriel. 1998. "What Caused the 
Asian Currency and Financial Crisis?" Part I and II, NBER Working Papers, No. 
6833 and 6844. 
Croce, Enzo and Kahn, Moshin. 2000. "Monetary Regimes and Inflation 
Targeting." Finance and Development, September 2000, Volume 37, Issue 3 
de Haan, Jacob. 2000 The History of the Bundesbank: Lessons for the European 
Central Bank. London: Routledge, 2000 
95 
Eichengreen, Barry. 2003. "European Monetary Unification." Journal of 
Economic Literature, September, 1993. 
Eichengreen, Barry. 1990. "One Money for Europe? Lessons from the US 
Currency Union." Economic Policy, April 1990, Issue 10, pi 17-187. 
Evans, Charles. 1998. "Real Time Taylor Rules and the Federal Funds Futures 
Market." Economic Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Third 
Quarter, 1998. 
Fischer B, Lenza M, Pill H and Reichlin L. 2006. "The Role of Money: Money 
and Monetary Policy in the Twenty First Century." 4th ECB Central Banking 
Conference, Frankfurt, 2006. 
Frankel, Jeffrey and Rose, Andrew. 1998. "The Endogeneity of the Optimum 
Currency Area." Economic Journal, July 1998, p 1009-25. 
Friedman, Milton, and Schwartz, Anna. 1963. A Monetary History of the United 
States. Princeton University Press. 
Friedman, Milton. 1967. "The Role of Monetary Policy." American Economic 
Review, Vol 58, p 1-17. 
Froyen, Richard T., Thomas Havrilesky, and Roger N. Waud. 1997. "The 
Asymmetric Effects of Political Pressure on U.S. Monetary Policy. " Journal of 
Macroeconoics, Vol 19, p 471-493. 
Gali, Jordi. 2006. "Comment onf Fishcer, Lenza, Pill and Reichlin's Money and 
Monetary Policy: The ECB Experience 1999-2006." Working Paper 2006. 
Galina, Hale and Jorda, Oscar. 2007. "Do Monetary Aggregates Help Forcast 
Inflation?" Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Letter, April 13, 
2007. 
Gerlach, Stefan, and Schnabel, Gert. 1999. "The Taylor Rule and Interest Rates 
in the EMU Area: A Note." Bank for International Settlements, Working Paper 
No. 73, August 1999. 
Greenburg, Hans. 2004. "ECB Governance and Monetary Policy in the Enlarged 
EMU." Conference on Challenges for Central Banks in an Enlarged EMU, p 71-
93. 
Haldane, Andrew, ed. 1995. Targeting Inflation. London: Bank of England 
96 
Hansen, Lars. 1982. "Large Sample Properties of the Generalized Methods of 
Moments." 
Econometrica, Vol. 50, p 1029-1054. 
Havrilesky, Thomas. 1993. The Pressures on American Monetary Policy. Boston, 
Kluwer. 
Huh, Chan. 1997. "Inflation Targeting." Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco 
Economic Letter, February, 1997. 
Judd, John, and Rudebusch, Glenn. 1998. "Taylor's Rule and the Fed: 1970-
1997." Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Review, 1998, Vol 3, p 
3-16. 
Judd, John P. and Bharat Trehan. 1995. "Has the Fed Gotten Tougher on 
Inflation?" FRBSF Weekly Letter, Number 95-13, March 31. 
Kozicki, Sharon. 1999. "How Useful are Taylor Rules for Monetary Policy?" 
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Review, Vol 84, p 5-25. 
Laxton D, Pesenti P. 2003. "Monetary Policy Rules for Open, Small, Emerging 
Economies." Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol 50, p 1109-1146. 
Leiderman, Leonardo and Svensson, Lars. 1995. Inflation Targeting. London: 
Centre for Economic Policy Research. 
Maier, Phillip, Sturm, Jan, de Haan, Jakob. 2002. "Political Pressure on the 
Bundesbank: An Emperical Investigation using the Havrelisky Approach." 
Journal of Macroeconomics, Vol 24, p 103-123. 
McCallum, Bennett. 2000. "The Present and Future of Monetary Policy Rules." 
International Finance, Vol 3, p273-286 
McCallum, Bennet, and Nelson, Edward. 2000. "Timeless Perspective vs. 
Discretionary Monetary Policy in Forward-Looking Models." Working paper. 
McKinley, Vern, Banaian. 2003. Central Bank Modernisation. Central Banking 
Publications, Ltd. 
Mehra, Yash. 2001. "The Bond Rate and Estimated Monetary Policy Rules." 
Journal of Economics and Business, Vol 53, Issue 4, 2001, p. 345-358. 
Mishkin, Frederic. 1991. "Asymetric Information and Financial Crisis: A 
Historical Perspective." Financial Markets and Financial Crisis. University of 
Chicago Press, p 69-108. 
97 
Mishkin, Frederic. 1996. "Understating Financial Crisis: A Developing Country 
Perspective." Annual World Bank Conference on Developing Economies, 1996, p 
29-62. 
Mishkin, Frederic. 2004. "Why the Fed Should Adopt Inflation Targeting." 
International Finance Vol 7, Issue 1, p 117-27. 
Orphanides, Athanasios, and Wieland, V. 2000. "Inflation Zone Targeting." 
European Economic Review, Vol 44, Issue 7. 
Rose, Andrew and Engel, Charles. 2002. "Currency Unions and International 
Integration." Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 34, No. 4, November 
2002. 
Sauer, Stephen, Sturm, Jan. 2003. "Using Taylor Rules to Understand ECB 
Monetary Policy." CESifo Working Paper Series. 
Seyfried, William and Bremmer, Dale. 2001. "Analyzing Fed Behavior Using a 
Dynamic Taylor Type Rule." Journal of Economics and Finance. Vol 25, Issue 1, 
Spring, 2001, p23-32. 
Stuart, A. 1996. "Simple Monetary Policy Rules." Bank of England Quarterly 
Bulletin, Vol 36, Issue 3, p 281-287. 
Svensson, Lars. 1999. "Inflation Targeting: Some Extensions. " Scandinavian 
Journal of Economics, 1999, Vol. 101, Issue 3, p 337-61. 
Svensson, Lars. 2002. "Inflation Targeting: Should It Be Modeled as an 
Instrument Rule or a Targeting Rule?" European Economic Review, Vol 46, 
2002,p771-780 
Svensson, Lars. 2003. "Indicator Variables for Optimal Policy." Journal of 
Monetary Economics, Vol 50, Issue 3. 
Taylor, John "The ECB and the Taylor Rule" International Economy Sep/Oct 98 
Vol. 12 Issue 5, p24. 
Taylor, John B. 1993. "Discretion Versus Policy Rules in Practice," Carnegie-
Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 39, p 195-214. 
Tobin. 1998. "Monetary Policy: Recent Theory and Practice," Current Issues in 
Monetary Economics. 
Ullrich, Katrin. 2003. "A Comparison Between the Fed and the ECB." ZEW 
Discussion Paper, 03-19. 
98 
Vaubel, R. 1997. "The Bureaucratic and Partisan Behaviour of Independent 
Central Banks: German and International Evidence." European Journal of 
Political Economy. Vol. 18. 
Walsh, Carl. 2003. "Speed Limit Policies: The Output Gap and Optimal 
Monetary Policy." American Economic Review, Vol 93, Issue 1. 
Woodford, Michael. 2006. "How Important is Money in the Conduct of 
Monetary Policy? The Role of Money: Money and Monetary Policy in the 
Twenty First Century." 4th ECB Central Banking Conference, Frankfurt, 2006. 
Woodford, Michael. 2001. "The Taylor Rule and Optimal Monetary Policy." 
American Economic Review, Vol 91, Issue 2, p 232-237. 
Yellen, Janet. 1995. Remarks at the FOMC, January 1995. 
A large part of the data used to explain the ECB was retrieved from the official 
website of the ECB with alterations. Users of the ECB's website may make free 
use of the information obtained, subject to the condition that the information is for 
educational purposes and the reproduction of the information must be done 
accurately and when doing so the ECB must be cited as the source. 
